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ABSTRACT 
THE GRAND ALLIANCE: FROM NECESSITY TO SUSPICION, DEVELOPMENT TO 
DECLINE 
By 
Robert M. Umholtz 
University of New Hampshire, December, 2015 
 
 This thesis analyzes the development and decline of the relationship among the members 
of the Grand Alliance during World War II.  The primary questions I answer are: what led to the 
creation of the Grand Alliance, and what caused the alliance to begin to decline at the peak of its 
effectiveness?  To answer these questions, I begin with the events that took place prior to the war 
and describe how world leaders addressed Hitler’s aggression as individuals in lieu of an 
alliance; thereby showing the importance of an alliance after the war began.  The study then 
proceeds chronologically, analyzing the correspondence among Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin 
to identify how these men worked together, despite their ideological differences to achieve 
victory over Hitler.  Primary sources are used as both evidence and as a means of understanding 
public opinion to show how the decisions made by the two leaders of democratic nations may 
have been swayed by public opinion.  Understanding the dynamics of the relationship leads to a 
better understanding of the irreconcilable differences among the objectives of the Big Three that 
ultimately led to the Cold War, despite their effectiveness as partners in terms of war planning.  
Ultimately, bargaining power varied among the members throughout the war, and created an 
atmosphere in which postwar plans were made by individuals with the best military position at 
the time of the decision making. 
  1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Japanese surrender on September 2, 1945, marked the end of the most lethal war in 
history.  It had been over six years since the war had started, longer if the Japanese invasion of 
China in 1937 represented the beginning of the war, and the toll on life and morale had been 
beyond comprehension.  The end of the war also marked a dramatic shift in international 
relations that redrew political borders and shaped modern society. Historical facts and personal 
opinions ever since have been used to argue about what happened after the war that caused the 
relationship between the U.S. Britain and the U.S.S.R. to deteriorate into the Cold War.  It is 
important, however, to recognize how that relationship was created and sustained throughout the 
war and what state the coalition was in when the war was over in order to understand what 
transpired after the war.  There has not been a coalition since World War II that was guided with 
such primacy by the leaders of the nations involved as the Allied forcers were by the Big Three. 
It can be concluded that the relationship between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.K. 
Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, and U.S.S.R. Premier Joseph V. Stalin united their 
respective nations and led to an Allied victory over the Axis Powers.  Unfortunately, that unity 
was not perfect and was achieved at a high price.  This study will show that the birth of the 
Grand Alliance was forged out of necessity, sustained by dependency, and at its peak moment of 
effectiveness was permeated with mistrust and suspicion.  Ironically, concerns over the postwar 
world were the primary points of contention during the war.  The end result was victory and the 
cost was a fragile balance of powers, which has vexed the world for over seventy years. 
In the process of researching the Grand Alliance, three books were instrumental in 
shaping the way I approached this topic and guiding my conclusions.  The first was Hugh 
Ragsdale’s The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II, 2004.  Ragsdale 
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argued the Soviet Union had been prepared to confront Hitler prior to Munich, but without an 
alliance Stalin was unwilling to face Hitler alone.1  His argument, which is cited early in this 
work, helped me evaluate the importance of a working coalition during World War II despite the 
coalition’s many flaws.   
The second book that influenced the way I analyzed the working relationship of the Big 
Three was Mark Stoler’s Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, 
and U.S. Strategy in World War II, 2000.  Stoler argued “To a great extent, the history of 
military concern with U.S. strategy and policy during World II is thus a history of military 
concern with the strategies and policies of Britain and the Soviet Union as both present allies and 
potential adversaries.”2  Through Stoler’s argument I was able to recognize the problems facing 
the Grand Alliance were not divided strictly between the East – Stalin – and the West – Churchill 
and Roosevelt, but to a degree there was mutual mistrust among all the members of this 
coalition.  This mistrust significantly affected how they interacted and worked with one another.   
Finally, Euginia Maresch’s Katyn 1940: The Documentary Evidence of the West’s 
Betrayl, 2010, provided evidence that helped me conclude the Grand Alliance was dedicated 
above all else to victory over Nazism, and the Big Three were willing to go to any length to 
ensure that success.  I must also note that I rely heavily on contemporary press reports 
throughout this thesis.   The reports are not used as direct evidence of events or rationale for 
actions that occurred, but rather to provide insight into the public atmosphere and public opinion 
that would have surely swayed the decisions making process of Roosevelt and Churchill. 
                                                
1 Hugh Ragsdale. The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 186-192. 
 
2 Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. 
Strategy in Wolrd War II, (Chapel HIll: The University of Norht Carolina, 2000), XI-XII.   
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 International diplomacy requires the development of relationships.  Trust and 
compromise are critical to forming healthy relationships.  On the eve of World War II there were 
countless relationships beginning, as well as ending, throughout the world.  By the end of World 
War II there was one relationship that proved more critical than any other.  This relationship 
provided the foundation for ending Nazi aggression and defeating the Axis powers in Europe and 
Asia. The relationship between President Franklin Roosevelt – leader of an isolationist nation, 
Winston Churchill – the British Bulldog, and Joseph V. Stalin – mistrustful authoritarian of the 
Soviet Union was the most critical relationship formed during the war. As important as this 
relationship was, it would never have formed if it were not for significant events that transpired 
prior to 1942, such as the U.S. entry into the war.  How did the events that unfolded between 
Munich and the bombing of Pearl Harbor develop the relationship that was so critical to victory 
over the Axis powers? The tripartite relationship that defeated Nazi Germany would have 
seemed preposterous to imagine prior to 1941 because each nation pursued individual interests 
that conflicted with the others.  Yet, it would be firmly established by the beginning of 1942, 
despite constant suspicions among its members.  The events from 1938 to December 1941 were 
decisive in forging this kindling relationship and deserve analysis to understand how the Grand 
Alliance came into existence. 
Prior to the Munich agreement, and even before troops began amassing on the border of 
Czechoslovakia, there were mixed emotions among the leaders and the public within the United 
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union over how to curb aggression on an international level.  
Those who harbored fear and malevolence among these nations, particularly between the West 
and the Soviet Union, outweighed the hopes of those who hoped that a working relationship 
could be obtained amongst them.  Some historians have gone so far as to argue war could have 
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been avoided if the strongest nations opposing Hitler had taken action prior to September of 
1938.  For example, historian Hugh Ragsdale, who tried to explain Soviet intentions and desires 
prior to World War II, argued that if an alliance among Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. could 
have been obtained prior to the Munich Pact, the history of the late thirties and early forties 
would have been much different.  He argued that an alliance against Hitler prior to Munich 
would certainly have led to war, but at that time Hitler’s war machine was not yet ready to fight 
and would have been quickly defeated.  He stated, “If the fight had occurred in September 
1938…World War II as we know it simply could not have happened.”3 One of the most 
significant figures of the Second World War believed this and more.  In his memoirs, Churchill 
recalled his belief that World War II could have been avoided.  He wrote, “One day President 
Roosevelt told me that he was asking publicly for suggestions about what the war should be 
called.  I said at once ‘the Unnecessary War.’ There never was a war more easy to stop than that 
which has just wrecked what was left of the world from the previous struggle.”4  Churchill made 
this statement to the president because he believed in hindsight, much as Ragsdale argued, that a 
united front against Germany at Munich would have disrupted Hitler’s plans enough to prevent 
the war.  Hitler was able to initiate his war plans because there was not a formidable relationship 
in place to stop him. 
As Churchill’s statement above shows, it is easy to look back on events from the past and 
see how different actions by world leaders could have produced a better outcome.  However, it 
would be inappropriate for a historian to act as an armchair quarterback judging the decisions of 
                                                
3 Hugh Ragsdale. The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), xix. 
 
4 Winston Churchill, Memoirs of the Second World War; an Abridgement of the Six Volumes of 
the Second World War (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), vii. 
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world leaders with the plethora of information now available to determine right from wrong and 
good from bad.  Even Churchill, who was a part of this history and did in fact advocate against 
appeasement at the time,5 should not have been so fast to judge his peers.  By looking at the 




                                                
5 For more on Churchill’s policy toward British appeasement see David Reynolds, Summits: Six 
Meetings That Shaped the Twentieth Century, (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 102. 
 




In England and the United States there was hostility, ideologically, toward the Soviet 
Union.6 These concerns were based on the belief that communism could spread its territorial 
domain throughout mainland Europe as well as its ideological position into Britain and the 
United States.  The Soviet Union was also hostile toward the west, but its fear was rooted more 
deeply in its territorial vulnerability than in its ideological point of view.  Historic Russia, the 
centrally located country that connected Europe and Asia, had a millennium of war and territorial 
advances and losses to etch the fear of invasion into its ethos. As a result, it was the official and 
instinctive Soviet position to resist any agreement with Western powers that would, in any way, 
threaten the territorial boundaries of the Soviet Union, and especially of historically Russian 
territories.7  This concept was reinforced while the Bolsheviks fought for control of Russia and 
continued into the 1930s during a time in which the United States would not recognize the Soviet 
Union as a nation under Soviet control. The result of the U.S. not recognizing Soviet leadership 
surely strained the relationship between the two.8  This however, was just the beginning of the 
                                                
6 For further information see Steven Merritt Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin: The Soviet 
Union, Great Britain, and the Origins of the Grand Alliance (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1988), p. 4 and John Lukacs. The Duel: The Eighty-day Struggle between 
Churchill and Hitler, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 14, 72, 146. 
 
7 For more information on this see below or reference Joseph V. Stalin in Stalin and the Soviet-
Finnish War, 1939-1940, translated by Tatyana Sokokina and Edited by E. N. Kulkov and O.A. 
Rzheshevsky, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 263. 
 
8 In November 16, 1933 President Franklin Roosevelt recognized the Soviet Union but the 
cordial relationship was not long lasting.  The relationship quickly deteriorated before the end of 
the year.  For more information see Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, United 
States Department of State, “Recognition of the Soviet Union, 1933,” 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/ussr, accessed April 23, 15. 
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problems that faced each of these nations which made an alliance in 1938 seem impossible. It is 
critical to understand each nation and its leaders individually to see what helped and hindered the 
development of their relationship at the beginning of 1942. 
The United Kingdom 
 
In Britain, the anti-communist sentiment was not as strong as it was in the United States, 
but British leaders were nonetheless hesitant to join arms with the Soviet Union on the eve of 
World War II. The relationship between Great Britain and the Soviet Union got off to a rocky 
start when the United Kingdom supported anti-Bolshevik forces in the same way the United 
States had during the Civil War following the Bolshevik Revolution.  However, international 
events caused the British Government to change its position toward the USSR to gain diplomatic 
support as old alliances began to become strained.  Historian Keith Neilson argued a changing 
balance of power within Europe, exacerbated by Japanese aggression and Germany’s 
rearmament in the 1930s, forced the British Government to work more closely with the Soviet 
Government.9  Despite the official position of the government, however, there were many 
politicians in Britain who did not have a favorable view of the Soviet Union during the 1930s.  
Political scientist William Taubman described one specific Briton’s attitude toward communism 
stating, “Winston Churchill yielded to no one in his anticommunism.”10 Ironically, Churchill 
would be essential to creating the alliance with Stalin as a chief member, but during the prewar 
years he was dead set against it.   
                                                
 
9 Keith Neilson, Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919-1939, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 43-87. 
 
10 William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy, 33. 
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In the years leading up to the war, there were more significant threats to the British 
position, internationally speaking, than an anti-communist sentiment.  Still recovering from the 
First World War, the British people feared having to go to war again.  This fear was manifested 
in Britain’s official position toward France and Germany.  For example, in the wake of the 
Armistice of 1918, relations between Britain and France were strained because Britain harbored 
resentment toward France for the war.  Britain also felt the reparations Germany was forced to 
pay could only lead to greater instability in Europe.  England thus continually argued with 
France over issues concerning Germany.  In attempting to stabilize Europe “London had become 
de facto the champion of German rights.”11  
The British government was not only resentful toward the French, but it also harbored 
angst toward the entire international community.  According to Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain, half a year prior to Munich British policy was being guided by a belief that the 
League of Nations had become incapacitated in terms of preventing war.12  This attitude, albeit 
justified in many ways, led Chamberlain to a ‘go it alone’ mentality in which he tried to settle 
international affairs in two-party talks.  Not only did Chamberlain believe he did not need the 
help of others in preventing war, but he also pushed away the help of the United States, Britain’s 
single most effective ally in the First World War, and ironically soon to be Britain’s greatest ally 
in the Second World War.   
British leaders went to great lengths to avoid becoming entangled in an alliance that they 
thought could draw Britain into another war.  Ragsdale pointed to evidence that proved this 
point.  He wrote, “in July 1937, U.S. President Roosevelt proposed to Chamberlain an Anglo-
                                                
11 Hugh Ragsdale. The Soviets, p. 2. 
 
12 “Mr. Chamberlain’s Statement on British Foreign Policy,” 1938. Bulletin of International 
News 15 (7) (Apr. 2): 13-6, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25642237, 13.  
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American consultation on international threats to the peace.  Without consulting his foreign 
secretary, Chamberlin abruptly refused – he did not like Americans.”13 Despite the neutral 
position maintained by the United States, Chamberlain refused to burden himself with alliances 
he felt would hinder his ability to prevent war. 
In addition to rejecting proposals from the United States, Chamberlain refused to work 
with the Soviet Union leading up to Munich. 14 Neilson provided evidence for this by describing 
Chamberlain’s efforts on the seventeenth of September, eleven days prior to the Munich 
meeting, to stop the efforts of a Soviet diplomat named Ian Maisky from establishing a rapport 
with the British government that may have prevented the Munich Agreement.  Describing 
Maisky’s efforts Neilson wrote, “For one thing, Maisky’s lobbying had produced, particularly 
among the Labour MPs [Members of Parliament], a popular belief that Moscow both could and 
would support Prague.”15 Clearly, Chamberlain did not want, or trust, others meddling in his 
affairs. Historian and columnist Arthur Bryant wrote an article in 1941 in which he also showed 
the Soviets had approached the British Government for an alliance before they made one with 
the Nazis.  He claimed the British Government was not willing to work with the Soviets because 
of their poor showing in World War I and because they believed Russia would quickly fall if 
they faced the Germans again.16  The repercussions of this decision obviously impacted the first 
                                                
13 Hugh Ragsdale, The Soviets, 39-40. 
 
14 For more on this topic see “Mr. Chamberlain’s Statement on British Foreign Policy,” 15. 
 
15  Keith Neilson, Britain, 248. 
 
16 Arthur Bryant, 1941, Our Note Book. Illustrated London News, July 12,1941 Issue 53334: 37, 
http://find.galegroup.com.libproxy.unh.edu/iln/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ILN&userG
roupName=durh54357&tabID=T003&docPage=article&docId=HN3100326939&type=multipag
e&contentSet=LTO&version=1.0, Accessed March 2015. 
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two years of World War II significantly.  The position of the Soviet Union will be discussed 
below, and as stated above there is no purpose in dwelling on what could have been, but rather 
focus should remain on what did happen.  As competent a leader and a man as Chamberlain may 
have been, taking on the duty of preventing an international crisis proved to be too great of a job 
for one man.  That being said, Chamberlain did everything he could to appease Hitler in the 
years leading up to war with the belief that he was saving mankind from another brutal war.      
Not everyone in British society, let alone the government, believed appeasement was the 
proper way to handle Hitler, though.  Winston Churchill, the man who would replace 
Chamberlain as Prime Minister in 1940, was a staunch critic of Neville Chamberlain’s position 
toward Germany prior to the war.  David Reynolds, renowned British historian, argued the 
meeting at Munich was one of the most significant events in the twentieth century.  He 
contrasted the way Chamberlain and Churchill saw appeasement.  In a poignant statement, 
Reynolds showed Churchill’s contempt for Chamberlain’s appeasement policy by writing, 
“Churchill believed the prime minister should have stood firm and stayed at home, rather than 
flying off to woo the dictator with a Czech dowry.”17  While Chamberlain believed Great Britain 
could handle Germany on its own diplomatically, Churchill believed it was necessary to involve 
other nations and not give in to German demands.  A strong alliance was what the world needed.  
This was exemplified by the relationship between Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt that began in 
early September of 1939 while Churchill was still First Lord of the Admiralty.18  The 
                                                
17 David Reynolds, Summits, 102. 
 
18 For more information on the personal relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt see 
Roosevelt, Franklin D., and Winston Churchill. Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime 
Correspondence, ed. Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, (New 
York: Saturday Review Press, 1975), 3-13 
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relationship that Churchill fostered in the early years of the war not only proved some parts of 
the British Government were willing to work well with others, but it also helped create a bond 
that would consist of two-thirds of the winning alliance.  Be that as it may, in 1938 Churchill 
only represented a faction within the British Government and not its official policy. 
The position Great Britain took during the interwar years facilitated a situation for 
Europe that was bleak at best.  However, when considering nations that could have done the 
most to stop Hitler, the United Kingdom and France are the countries that failed Europe and the 
world the most.  The position these nations took prior to the war in many ways led to the war.  
Author and historian Williamson Murray described the dismal position prior to the war in this 
way: 
At every turn in the long road from the Abyssinian crisis to the beginning of the 
Second World War, they had preached caution, seen dangers where none existed, 
prophesied doom, and agreed to the abandonment of every position.  Largely 
because of their self-fulfilling prophecies Britain and France faced Germany alone 




 The interwar period for the Soviet Union was much different than it was for Western 
powers.  World War I had been devastating worldwide, but Russia had additional interwar 
problems.  In addition to suffering unfathomable losses during the war, Russia, which dropped 
out of World War I by signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, was in the middle of a 
revolution at the time that evolved into a civil war.  By the time the Bolsheviks gained control of 
the country the rest of the world was enjoying the highlife of the roaring twenties.  By the end of 
the 1920s, Lenin, the first leader of the first communist nation in history, had died and Joseph V. 
                                                
19 France is not discussed in depth because they did not have a representative in the Grand 
Alliance.  For more information see Williamson Murray The Change in the European Balance of 
Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 369. 
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Stalin was the supreme leader of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R).  Politically, 
the Politburo governed the Soviet Union, but no official decision would be made without Stalin’s 
approval.  The position of the U.S.S.R. was perilous.  Not only did a totalitarian leader who 
feared for the future of this budding union lead the Soviet Union, but also nations that posed the 
greatest threat to the Soviet Union feared the spread of the Soviet Union’s burdens and politics.  
With few friends, and a struggling economy, there was little reason for optimism for the 
Russians.   
Above all else, it was the personality and character of Joseph Stalin that dictated the 
position of the Soviet Union leading up to World War II.  While Stalin’s excessive 
defensiveness, which one is tempted to call paranoia, may have gotten the best of him frequently 
and adversely affected the Soviet Union, his concerns were not necessarily unfounded.  The 
anticommunist sentiment has already been discussed above, and therefore there was reason for 
Stalin to believe it existed.  For example, after Operation Barbarossa began in 1941 and Russia 
made requests for international help “it occurred to some, including Senator Harry S. Truman, 
that the West could do worse than follow Stalin’s example by standing aside, or even fanning the 
flames, while its two totalitarian enemies killed each other off.”20  
 Stalin’s personality was directly reflected in the way he ruled the U.S.S.R.  Robert 
Service, of Oxford University, wrote a biography of Stalin in which there are reoccurring themes 
that show Stalin as a man who needed to be seen as the victor of every struggle he encountered 
and constantly driven by his ego.  Service went as far as to describe him in this way: “Nastiness 
to acquaintances had been his hallmark since he had been a youngster.  Ambition too had been a 
characteristic.  But he wanted to rise to revolutionary eminence on his own terms; and whenever 
                                                
20 William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy, 34. 
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others baulked him, he told them they were wrong and stupid.”21 It was with this attitude, and as 
head of one of the largest populations of people in the world, that Stalin began to establish his 
foreign policy leading up to the war.  The central principle of that policy was that the Soviets 
would work with any party that could ensure the safety and protection of the Soviet Union, even 
if it meant cooperating with anti-communist nations and leaders. 
 It is difficult to know what Stalin’s true end game was in 1938.  What is unquestionable 
is that the Soviet Union was willing to do whatever it took to ensure a positive outcome in its 
own future.  In this light, Ragsdale argued that prior to Munich the Soviet Union was willing to 
work with the West in order to stop German aggression.22 In fact, Russia’s cunning diplomat 
Vyacheslav Molotov remarked on the failure of the West to come to a suitable agreement with 
the Soviet Union just prior to the Soviet decision to sign the nonaggression pact.  He stated, “As 
the negotiations had shown that the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance could not be 
expected [with Britain and France], we could not but explore other possibilities of ensuring 
peace and eliminating the danger of war between Germany and the USSR.”23  Molotov’s 
argument made it clear the Soviet Union blamed the British and the French for the lack of an 
alliance, at least publicly. 
 On the other hand, some observers and historians have speculated that Stalin had been 
willing to wait out the war, if that were possible, as Senator Truman recommended for the U.S., 
                                                
21 Robert Service, Stalin: A Biography, (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2005), 49. 
 
22 For Ragsdale’s argument on this see Ragsdale, The Soviets, 29. 
 
23 Vyacheslav Molotov, “Speech to the Fourth (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet on the 
Negotiations with Britain and France and the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany,” 1939, in 
Soviet Documents), 363-4. 
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not only to protect the Soviet Union, but also to increase its territory.  Demaree Bess, reporter for 
the popular Saturday Evening Post, argued in 1939 that Stalin only postponed joining either side 
of the war to make sure that there was a war: “With events in Europe rushing headlong toward 
disaster, the Russian dictator waited for the precise psychological moment to spring his coup 
upon a stunned and bewildered world.”24  Bess’s attitude toward the Soviet Union, and 
specifically Stalin, was very suspicious and perhaps an overstatement of Stalin’s actions.  
However, it was not without some merit.  Stalin’s decision to attack Finland and start the Winter 
War was an example of his plan to create a buffer territory between Western Europe and the 
Soviet Union.25 I will discuss the Winter War in greater depth below, but the concept of a buffer 
territory has been significant throughout Russian history.   
Expansion has been a centerpiece of Russian authority and foreign policy since the 
Fourteenth century.  In the sixteenth century Ivan IV, also known as Ivan the Terrible, gained his 
reputation, in part, because of the work he did to expand the territory of Russia.  Imperial 
Russian foreign policy relied heavily on expansion as a means of ensuring safety for the 
hinterland.  In addition to creating a cultural revolution, Peter the Great reinforced this policy of 
expanding Russian territory as had Ivan IV.26  Peter’s self-proclaimed admirer Catherine II 
subsequently followed this policy by annexing Poland and Crimea, and so the history of the 
Russian Empire continued.   As a land of what seemed like unlimited borders, located between 
Europe and Asia, the Russian psyche developed amidst continually changing frontiers.  It had 
                                                
24 Demaree Bess, "Stalin Over Europe." Saturday Evening Post 212, no. 16 (October 14, 1939): 
5-50. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost (accessed March 13, 2015), 47. 
 
25  Joseph V. Stalin, “Seventh Session: 17 April 1940, Evening” in Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish 
War, 263. 
26 For more information see James Cracraft, The Revolution of Peter the Great, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2003) chapters 2, 3, and 4. 
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been over one thousand years since the first Russian dynasty, the Rurikid Dynasty, claimed 
territory East of the Danube when the Bolsheviks rose to power.  The concept of security that 
had been engrained in the Russian people was as important to Stalin and the Soviet Union as it 
had been to Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century.  Soviet policy followed the practice of 
expanding its authority into neighboring lands in order to regain the territorial claims of Imperial 
Russia lost at the end of World War I.  This was especially true for the Baltic states and Poland. 
The	United	States	
	
The position of the United States in 1938 was not nearly as precarious as that of the 
Soviet Union or Great Britain.  With a successful showing in World War I, an ocean on each side 
of the continent to separate it from the rest of the world, and a political policy that insisted it stay 
out of European issues that could bring war, the United States had little to be concerned about as 
far as physical security was concerned. However, physical security did not protect American 
interests abroad.  The concept of an international community and globalization were notions that 
would be fully developed after World War II, but nonetheless international trade and economic 
markets were already interconnected, exemplified by the fact that the Great Depression affected 
nations worldwide.  There was no way in which the United States could remain fully isolated 
from Europe. 
Despite the interconnectedness of the world that eventually brought the Untied States into 
the war, however, there were many reasons for the U.S. to choose not to fight once the war began 
in Europe.  The results of World War I (WWI) had left feelings of angst rather than peace in the 
hearts of world leaders.  Woodrow Wilson, champion of the Fourteen Points, used his position at 
the end of WWI to create the League of Nations and try to prevent future wars from occurring.  
However, those in the U.S. who opposed the League of Nations “feared the consequences of 
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involvement in Europe’s tangled politics, now even more complex because of the 1919 peace 
settlement. They adhered to a vision of the United States returning to its traditional aversion to 
commitments outside the Western Hemisphere.”27  Thus, the United States refused to join the 
League of Nations even though Wilson had introduced the concept.  In many ways this was the 
first step toward the policies that would lead it to be considered an isolated nation at the 
beginning of the war.  
While history had made the United States wary of its relationship with Europe, it had to 
assess the events that were transpiring in the East.  The Pacific may have created a buffer 
between the United States and Asia but the U.S. had interests in the Pacific from Hawaii to the 
Midway Islands.  The growing communist influence in China presented economic and 
ideological problems for the United States.  Simultaneously, Japan’s growth as a militaristic and 
imperialist nation presented a physical threat to the United States.  It was from the East that the 
notorious attack on Pearl Harbor that forced the U.S. to join the war came. 
China’s situation was one of internal division amidst external occupation.  The fall of the 
Qing Dynasty in 1912 had left China unstable and divided.  In 1927, a civil war erupted in which 
the Chinese Nationalists led by Chiang Kai-Shek were battling the Chinese Communists, which 
would eventually be led to victory by Mao Zedong.  Additionally, the Japanese, spreading their 
empire throughout the Pacific, took advantage of the Chinese instability and began a brutal 
annexation of the Chinese mainland.  The scope of brutality and destruction that was caused by 
the civil war and occupation are too great to detail here, but it was during this time that the 
United States sent representatives to China to help the struggling anti-communist leader Chiang 
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Kai-Shek.28  China was a significant problem facing the United States in the East; however, there 
was another menacing power in the East that was overlooked by some, but not all, in the years 
leading up to the war.   
Japanese aggression in the East was not limited to China.  In 1941, historians Joseph 
Barnes and Harriet Moore made an almost prophetic statement.  They said, “To permit the Soviet 
Far East to fall into Axis hands – whether German or Japanese – would mean the loss of control 
over the north Pacific as well as the encirclement of China.”29  They were not the only ones to 
see the danger posed by Japan in the Pacific Ocean.  Political scientist Stewart Bryant believed 
there was the possibility of “a trans-pacific [sic] war” and therefore America “must be armed not 
only with military power but also with comprehension of the unprecedented forces set loose in 
this world.”30  He added, “It is time to use large maps and to assess the consequences of coming 
terrific impacts which threaten our security.”31  Others were more specific.  William Magistretti, 
writing for the journal Pacific Affairs, went as far as to argue there was a possibility that “Japan 
will continue her southward movement, come what may, until eventually America is forced to 
take action.”32 It is clear that there was much to be concerned with during the build up to war. It 
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is important to remember that the United Sates took an official policy that is now referred to as 
isolationism but that was not a strict rule by which leaders and policy makers remained fixed 
regardless of the situation.  The United States still participated as member of the global 
community as far as trade and diplomacy were concerned, but it did all it could to remain neutral 
toward situations that would drag it into another armed conflict. 
On the eve of the Munich Agreement the necessity did not exist to draw Great Britain, 
the Soviet Union, and the United States into an alliance to prevent Hitler’s aggression.  Great 
Britain, led by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in 1938, was set on going-it-alone and trying 
to work a deal that would prevent war and provide security for most of Europe and especially the 
British Empire.  The Soviet Union on the other hand, led by Stalin, was willing, if necessary, to 
work with Western Europe to form an alliance to stop Nazi aggression as long as that alliance 
could ensure the security of the Soviet Union. Stalin was by nature mistrustful and on the 
defensive and did not trust any capitalist nation, but he trusted a fascist nation even less.  
However, Russian history was all too familiar to this Georgian and he would sign an agreement 
with anyone he thought could help protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Soviet 
Union.  The United States, under Roosevelt, was determined to prevent the spread of 
communism and not to become a part of future wars that could easily be avoided due to the 
protection provided by two great moats – the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.  Judging by the 
position each of these nations took leading up to the war it would seem there was little more than 
a glimmer of hope, once war broke out, that an alliance among them could be created capable of 
conquering Hitler and his allies.   




What happened in 1938 that caused Chamberlain to work out an agreement with Hitler?  
Leading up to the Munich Agreement, Adolf Hitler worked to rearm and reunite the German-
speaking people.  His goal was to vindicate Germany after World War I.  He believed her leaders 
had betrayed Germany in the aftermath of World War I, and the only acceptable redemption was 
to renew Germany’s international position through the domination of Europe.  As European 
leaders worked to prevent Germany from undermining the unstable balance of power in Europe, 
Hitler moved troops onto the Czechoslovakian border.  His public plan was to help German-
speaking peoples in a region of Czechoslovakia, known as Sudetenland, separate from 
Czechoslovakia.  It is now clear that his final objective was to consolidate all of Czechoslovakia 
into his domain.33  At that time, however, there was no way to know Hitler’s plan.  There is no 
doubt that Chamberlain had good intentions when he went to Munich to work out a peaceful 
solution with Hitler.  It was with the highest hopes for peace that Chamberlain said, “If the 
problem of Czechoslovakia could be solved it would go far to re-establish stability over an area 
much wider than that immediately concerned.”34  
The possibility of war was recognized around the globe. On the eve of the Munich 
Agreement, the Bulletin of International News reported on a message Roosevelt sent to other 
world leaders, “On September 26 President Roosevelt sent a telegram direct to Herr Hitler and to 
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Dr. Benes [President of Czechoslovakia] in which he appealed for a settlement of their 
differences by methods other than those of force.”35 The president sent similar letters to 
Chamberlain and the French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier.  In these letters President 
Roosevelt stressed the neutral position of the United States and also stated that he believed 
cooler heads could find a peaceful agreement that would prevent war.  Chamberlain and Daladier 
each responded by assuring they were doing all they could to help resolve the situation on the 
German-Czech border.  Daladier went so far as to say, “remaining faithful to the spirit and letter 
of these pledges, we continue with unfailing tenacity to look for any procedure or form of 
agreement which may be compatible with the dignity and vital interests of the nations 
involved.”36 Hitler, however, justified his actions by complaining about the effect that the Treaty 
of Versailles had on Germany.  He then wrote, “never in history has the trust of a nation been so 
shamefully disappointed as was then the case.”37  Roosevelt simply responded by emphasizing 
the importance of negotiating and avoiding war.38        
 Roosevelt’s letter to European leaders in which he called for a resolution that would 
ensure future peace confirms that while the United States pursued policies that avoided the 
quagmire of European politics it was, nonetheless, aware of the implications war would have for 
America.  Relations worldwide had become strained by September 28, 1938.  Japan had begun 
its occupation of China and Korea and was increasing its influence throughout the Pacific, and 
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Germany was on Czechoslovakia’s doorstep.  The signs appear clear now, but at the time world 
leaders were uncertain what the future would hold.  It was in this state of affairs that 
Chamberlain decided to appease Germany by pressuring Benes to make concessions. 
Hours before he made an agreement with Hitler in Munich, Chamberlain addressed 
Parliament.  As he saw it, there were three options for the British people to choose from leading 
up to the Munich Agreement.  The first, go to war.  The second, let things play out and see what 
happened.  The third, head to Germany and try to work out an agreement between the Germans 
and the Czechs that would be sufficient to prevent hostilities.39  In Parliament several shouts of 
praise went up for Chamberlain’s plan.40  Many believed he was doing a great thing by 
preventing Hitler from sending his military into Czechoslovakia to claim Sudetenland by force.  
However, admiration for Chamberlain was not unanimous. 
One Member of Parliament, a Mr. Gallacher, spoke up and said, “No one desires peace 
more than I and my party, but it must be a peace based upon freedom and democracy and not 
upon the cutting up and destruction of a small State. I want to say that the policy of the National 
Government has led to this crisis.”41  Words such as these have led some historians to build their 
argument that Chamberlain’s government created an atmosphere in which Hitler raised his nation 
from the defeat of World War I to the overwhelming force it was at the beginning of World War 
II.  Chamberlain’s name has thus become synonymous with appeasement. Therefore, it could be 
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argued that Chamberlain’s appeasement policies were the primary reason the international 
community was unable to stop Hitler’s aggression before the war began.   
Even before war had begun in Europe there were critics among the British people who 
believed Chamberlain’s policies would not prevent war; additionally, these policies had reduced 
the character of the British people in the eyes of the international community.  A few months 
after Munich the Royal Institute of International Affairs published an article that made such 
claims.  Historian Arnold J. Toynbee wrote, “a pound of flesh was cut out of Czechoslovakia the 
other day, and I think a good deal of the life-blood of the British Empire flowed from that 
wound, though the flesh was not cut out of our body, but out of somebody else's body.”42  In an 
even more pointed statement, he provided several examples of why he expected Chamberlain’s 
appeasement plans to fail.  He wrote,  
Today we English people wear a medal with ‘Peace’ inscribed on it, but this 
peace-medal has some bars, and, when we look closely, we can see on the top bar 
engraved ‘Manchuria,’ on the next ‘Abyssinia,’ on the next ‘Spain,’ and then 
‘China’ and ‘Czechoslovakia.’ So far, all the bars to our peace-medal have been 
cast out of other people's coin.43  
 
Political figures of the early to mid-twentieth century were surely as aware then, as they 
are today, that any decision made would be second-guessed by others.  So Chamberlain 
proceeded with what he saw as the best option, supported by the majority of his constituency.  
Other world leaders, such as the French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier, also supported 
Chamberlain, and together they proceeded with their plan to give Hitler little bits of what he 
wanted in an attempt to stop him from using force to claim more.   
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Of the three future allies against Nazi Germany, only one was represented at Munich.  
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union were consulted, which reaffirmed Stalin’s 
concerns that the capitalist powers were unwilling to work with the Soviet Union.  The four 
members present during the negotiations at Munich included Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain, who represented the Great Britain; Prime Minister Edouard Daladier, who 
represented France; Prime Minister Benito Mussolini, who represented Italy; and the Fuhrer 
Adolf Hitler, who represented Germany.  Interestingly, there were no Czech representatives 
present when the fate and dismemberment of their nation was at hand.  Historian Keith Eubank 
addressed this point by writing, “Chamberlain and Daladier asked for a Czech representative to 
be present …Hitler dismissed the request … with the announcement that no Czech was 
immediately available to speak with authority for the Prague government.”44 Eubank also 
discussed the fact that the Soviet Union had not been invited to the meeting at Munich which 
worked out to their benefit.  He argued Russia’s “leaders claimed that because they had been 
ignored, they were not responsible for the consequences.”45  Munich was not only a failure 
because of the decisions made but also because of who was, and more importantly who was not, 
invited to the meeting.  Chamberlain and Daladier made the mistake of not inviting other nations 
that could have formed an alliance to oppose Hitler at Munich. 
Still, it must be remembered, “for nearly all the strategic missteps there were seemingly 
good and logical reasons for taking what in retrospect was the wrong course.”46  Chamberlain 
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and others who supported appeasement should, to a limited degree, be lauded for their attempt to 
prevent the immediate and long-term effects that war causes.  Eubank concluded; “Yet, in the 
final analysis, Hitler more often than not made correct strategic decisions, while the Allied 
leaders did not.”47  Churchill and Roosevelt, however, would have been wise to learn from 
Chamberlain’s experience with Hitler. 
Munich	to	Poland	
	
Late in the evening, September 29, 1938, the leaders of four nations – Germany, Italy, 
France, and Great Britain – made an agreement.  In the interest of international peace, these 
leaders decided Czechoslovakia would lose something more important than the land it was also 
required to relinquish.  Along with Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia was forced to give up its 
national sovereignty – the most critical element of the modern nation state, the ability to decide 
what takes place within its borders – when the leaders at Munich took it upon themselves to 
break Czechoslovakia apart.  With their actions, Chamberlain and Daladier unknowingly gave 
Hitler permission to cross any border he desired to fulfill with his ambitious plans.  Chamberlain 
was unaware of the evil he had unleashed on Europe with the wave of a pen.  He said in a 
speech, “the first and the most immediate object of my visit was achieved.  The peace of Europe 
was saved…What was the alternative?”48 
Many believed Chamberlain had prevented war; however, there were a few members of 
the British Government that believed Neville Chamberlain had failed the people of 
Czechoslovakia and the international community.  Parliamentary member Duff Cooper, for 
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example, was appalled by Chamberlain’s actions.  In a speech of resignation in parliament he 
argued Germany’s annexation of Austria, which had taken place in March of that year, should 
have been warning enough and Czechoslovakia should have been a call to arms against Hitler’s 
actions.  Cooper still hoped Chamberlain could be proved right but did not think that would be 
the case.  He said, “The Prime Minister may be right. I can assure you, Mr. Speaker, with the 
deepest sincerity, that I hope and pray that he is right, but I cannot believe what he believes. I 
wish I could. Therefore, I can be of no assistance to him in his Government.”49  With that Duff 
Cooper resigned, but he would later find himself working once again for his government under 
Winston Churchill and supporting the principles he valued so highly.   
 In the wake of Munich, President Roosevelt was able to see the writing on the wall as 
well.  In his annual address to Congress he made reference to what going on in Europe and 
showed his concern for the future.  He believed what was happening around the world was a 
direct threat to the principles upon which the United States stood.  Interestingly, his speech was 
made before war had begun, but it was clear that the President was willing to work toward an 
alliance against aggression.  He also wanted to change current ‘neutrality laws’ to ensure those 
who threatened freedom could not use these laws to their advantage.  The Bulletin of 
International News published President Roosevelt’s speech in this way: 
He began by saying that there was need for further warning of the storm signals 
from across the seas, as, while a war which threatened to envelop the whole world 
had been averted, it had ‘become increasingly clear that world peace is not 
assured,’ and he went on, ‘All about us rage undeclared wars, military and 
economic. All about us are threats of new aggression, military and 
economic’…Mr. Roosevelt then intimated that the Neutrality Laws might need 
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alteration, since they might operate unfairly, or even give aid to an aggressor and 
deny it to the victim.50  
 
 Nearly three years would pass before the United States officially entered the war, and it 
was over three years until American soldiers fought for the Allies.  It was still over half a year 
until France and Great Britain would declare war on Germany, but President Roosevelt was 
already preparing for the possibility of another world war. The events that occurred between the 
President’s message to Congress and the outbreak of war created an environment that made the 
Grand Alliance necessary.   
Non-Aggression	Pact	
	
During the time leading up to Munich Pact, the Soviet Union was courting France and 
Britain while simultaneously seeking Germany’s hand for peace.  However, as time passed 
Russia began to feel a decision had to be made in the interest of national security.  In August of 
1939, Vyacheslav Molotov and Joachim Von Ribbentrop made their terms of agreement public 
and signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact.  This quick change was unwarranted, as far as 
the West was concerned, but it revealed a great deal about Stalin’s personality and his decision 
making process.  Historian Geoffrey Roberts described Stalin’s plan in this way: 
Stalin’s decision to do this deal with Hitler on the very eve of a new European 
war was a dramatic, last-minute improvisation.  Only a few days before this 
radical turn in Soviet policy Stalin had been negotiating the terms of military 
alliance with Britain and France, but he feared London and Paris were 
manoeuvring [sic] to provoke a Soviet-German war that would allow them the 
luxury of standing aside while the Nazis and the communists slugged it out on the 
Eastern Front.51  
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Stalin’s willy-nilly collaboration with whichever side promoted his position was 
haphazard, and would have great repercussions on the Grand Alliance later.  At the time, 
however, this action was not recognized as a significant loss to the West.  The leaders of the 
Soviet Union were foresighted enough to know Hitler might turn his back on them.  Therefore, 
they offered several explanations – some public and some private – as to why they had decided 
to pursue a non-aggression pact with Germany.  Their explanations justified why they had once 
condemned German fascism only to sign a pact with Hitler.  The explanations were also meant 
as plausible excuses in the event that the Soviet Government needed to pursue an alliance with 
the West in the future. 
Molotov said in a speech to the Supreme Soviet: “We appreciated the fact that it was 
difficult for the Governments of Great Britain and France to make an abrupt change in their 
policy from the unfriendly attitude towards the Soviet Union, which had existed until quite 
recently, to serious negotiations with the USSR.”52 Regardless, Molotov concluded that the 
capitalist powers did not go far enough to ensure they would provide the Soviet Union with 
mutual support, and for that reason, the Soviet Government had to pursue their pact with 
Germany.  Mutual support and assistance was a reoccurring concern of the Soviet Union once 
the Alliance was formed as well, and in August of 1939 it was such a motivational factor that it 
prevented the Soviet Union from working with Great Britain and France. 
This was publicly reaffirmed by the Soviet military leader Kliment Voroshilov in a press 
interview when asked about the pact with the Axis powers.  His answer was interesting because 
he referred to Germany as the aggressor and claimed the Soviet Union offered support to France 
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and Great Britain in the event of war if Poland allowed Soviet troops to pass through her.53   
However, at that time “the government of Poland was suspicious of the Soviet Union at best and 
hostile to Czechoslovakia.”54  Therefore, no pact was made with Great Britain and France, 
according to Voroshilov.  However, Poland’s fear of what would happen if Soviet troops crossed 
the border was not absurd, as they soon found out.   
Poland	to	Barbarossa	
	
On September 1, 1939, German forces moved into Poland and set off a series of events 
that would determine the fate of millions and change the international balance of power.  France 
and the United Kingdom responded by reaffirming their promise to defend Poland and declared 
war on Germany on the September 3, 1939.  This put the Soviet Union at odds with Great Britain 
and France since these nations had promised to defend Poland should she be attacked, but the 
Soviet Union did not go to war with Great Britain or France.  On the same day that Britain and 
France declared war on Germany, half a world away, President Roosevelt took to the air and 
addressed the nation.  He said, “Until four-thirty this morning I had hoped against hope that 
some miracle would prevent a devastating war in Europe and bring to an end the invasion of 
Poland by Germany.”55 The president then went on to reaffirm to the country the importance he 
and the nation placed on freedom of religion and of thought, as well as recognizing that the 
United States was not completely isolated from world events, and that the war would have an 
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impact on American lives.  He then went on to address the position of neutrality the United 
States was going to take.  He stated: 
Let no man or woman thoughtlessly or falsely talk of America sending its armies 
to European fields. At this moment there is being prepared a proclamation of 
American neutrality. This would have been done even if there had been no 
neutrality statute on the books, for this proclamation is in accordance with 
international law and with American policy.56  
 
The President further stated, “I have said not once but many times that I have seen war 
and that I hate war. I say that again and again. I hope the United States will keep out of this 
war… And I give you assurances that every effort of your Government will be directed toward 
that end.”57 To that end, on the September 5, 1939, the United States officially declared its 
neutrality.  It must have appeared to Britain and France that their hope of relying on the United 
States, as they had in the previous Great War, was slim.  Additionally, Hitler must have found 
this statement to be quite encouraging.   
By dawn on the sixth of September, in Paris, the outlook for France and England was 
utterly dismal.  The Untied States had just declared its neutrality and the most formidable power 
east of Germany, Stalin’s USSR, had made an agreement with Germany.  No one at that time 
could possibly have conceived that the Grand Alliance that would bring the war to a close would 
consist of Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin.  However, despite the all-encompassing darkness that 
seemed to be closing in on the allies, a beacon of hope, like a lighthouse in a storm, sounded out 
from the United States to the U.K.  On the eleventh of September, days after affirming American 
neutrality, the American president did something that changed the outcome of the war.  Editors 
of a book containing the correspondence between Roosevelt and Churchill describe the action in 
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this way; “Franklin D. Roosevelt…in an extraordinary and virtually unprecedented move, the 
President of the neutral United States invited Winston Churchill…to enter into direct 
correspondence with him.”58   
The initiative taken by Roosevelt was significant because of the neutrality declared by the 
United States, but even more so because Winston Churchill was not the head of His Majesty’s 
Government.  It would be nearly eight months before Churchill became Prime Minister of 
England.  Perhaps the president chose to contact Churchill because they had held similar 
positions during the First World War as mentioned in their first correspondence.59 It was most 
likely because of Churchill’s willingness to work with the United States in the past, while 
Neville Chamberlain believed the United Kingdom could handle Hitler on their own, that the 
President reached out to Churchill.  As in any new relationship, the starter had been ignited and 
the wartime affair had begun between the leader of the U.S. and the future leader of the U.K.   
It would be another month before the two leaders continued their correspondence, and 
even then it was a matter of protocols at sea to avoid confusion over freedom of navigation in 
open waters.60 As the war raged, events began unfolding from Washington to London to Moscow 
that helped build the relationship between Roosevelt and Churchill and eventually Stalin.  
However, there were barriers that had to be overcome and events that had to transpire before the 
actual alliance was formed.  The first barrier was American neutrality. 
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Despite Roosevelt’s inclination to help the Allies battle tyranny, he was still the President 
of a democratic and isolationist nation.  Public support was essential to his presidency.  The 
United States continued to remain neutral and Roosevelt continued to sign various forms of 
legislation and agreements to reinforce neutrality.  For example, in October of 1939 the United 
States signed in support of the Neutrality of Inter-American committee and Pan American 
Union.61  However, that same month the Congressional Digest printed an article in which 
President Roosevelt argued that Congress must change the ‘Neutrality Law’ which he claimed 
would enable him to help England and France, whereas if the laws were left unchanged he would 
be unable to help prevent war (the debate happened prior to the first hostile action).  In true 
political fashion, Congress decided, due to disagreements, they would postpone the debate and in 
the meantime war erupted in Europe.62  The nation was divided, but despite Roosevelt’s public 
claims, it was clear where his heart was.  He cared for the American people and their wishes, but 
he desired peace even more so, peace that was free of oppression.  Stalin was able to act upon his 
own convictions regardless of what the Soviet public desired, but Churchill and Roosevelt were 
both accountable to public opinion.  Therefore, Roosevelt took the steps he thought necessary to 
protect the United States from German aggression and skirted the thin line between support and 
neutrality, pushing the U.S. ever closer to war. 
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While the United States was tackling the neutrality debate, the Soviet Union was 
embarking on its own mission.  In traditional Russian form, the Soviet Union approached 
Finland with a request that was meant to provide security for the U.S.S.R. from the Baltic states.  
According to the League of Nations Official Journal, on the fourteenth of October 1939, the 
Soviet Union presented a proposal in which it would work with Finland to give the U.S.S.R. 
some of its land near Leningrad in order to create a safety buffer for the Soviet Union.  The 
Soviet Union agreed to give up land in exchange for that territory.63  The strategic military 
significance of Leningrad had been established in the 18th century.  Formerly St. Petersburg and 
Petrograd, the city was built by Peter the Great and remained the capital of Russia until the fall 
of the Russian Empire, and it is easy to see why the Soviets wanted to ensure its safety.  
However, it is equally clear why the Finns would not want to give up any of their territory.  
Stalin, however, would have his wish fulfilled one way or another.  On November 30, 1939, the 
Soviet-Finnish War, also known as the Winter War, began. 
The Winter War lasted a mere three and a half months, but it had serious implications for 
the events that followed.  The Soviet Union won, but it was not an easy victory, and it caused 
significant problems for the Soviet Union with nations on both sides of the war.  H. Shukman, 
British historian, wrote, “On 14 December the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations.  
The United States declared a ‘moral embargo’ and prohibited trade with Russia…”64 The 
relationship between the West and the Soviet Union was already strained, it was stretched to a 
greater extent when the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed, and it seemed this move 
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was the last one needed to forever pit the West against the Soviet Union.  However, German 
reactions to the Winter War prevented the Soviet Union from severing all ties with the West.  
Hitler had praised Finnish resistance despite their loss. 
 Addressing whether or not the Soviet Union should have attacked Finland, Stalin stated, 
“I think that the war was inevitable.  The war was necessary since the peace talks with Finland 
had produced no results.  We had to protect Leningrad because its safety is the safety of our 
Fatherland.”65  Stalin’s victory over Finland was a strategic misstep.  The Red Army’s poor 
performance revealed to Hitler that the Soviet Union was not yet ready for war.  Shukman 
described the Germans as praising the Finns for their resistance despite their loss.66 On the other 
hand, Stalin believed the Winter War was nothing more than practice for what was to come.  He 
knew the future held the possibility for war with Germany and he wanted not only a buffer but 
also a test run of his military in the West.  He said, “We knew that the Finns had France and 
England behind them and that the Germans, Swedes and Norwegians were supporting them in an 
underhanded way, America supported them, and Canada, too.”67 Stalin was so suspicious that he 
believed the entire world was against him.  The question that remained was: how would the 
Allies convince Stalin to trust them, or if not trust at least work with them?  
Shortly after Stalin explained the rationale for the Soviet-Finnish War a significant event 
took place in Great Britain that proved crucial for the formation of the Grand Alliance.  Little 
communication had taken place between Roosevelt and Churchill until mid May 1940.   On May 
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10, 1940, Neville Chamberlain left the office of Prime Minister of England and Winston 
Churchill assumed leadership of the nation along with the war effort to defeat Hitler.  
Unfortunately for Churchill, when he took office his country was struggling to slow Hitler’s 
progress and their position became more precarious with each day that passed.  On May 15th, 
five days after assuming his new role, Churchill resumed his correspondence with President 
Roosevelt.  The messages between the two leaders increased in frequency while the duration 
between messages decreased, thus bonding Churchill and Roosevelt and their respective nations.   
In his first letter to Roosevelt as Prime Minister, Churchill did not delay in laying out his 
requests to the United States.  The first request was that the United States change from a position 
of neutrality to ‘nonbelligerency’ [sic].   In Churchill’s opinion this would have given the United 
States the ability to help the United Kingdom in every way short of combat.68  He then presented 
a list of requests he had for the United States.  His request included “forty or fifty” destroyers, 
“several hundred of the latest types of aircraft,” “anti-aircraft equipment and ammunition,” a 
“visit of a United States squadron to Irish ports” and finally that the U.S. “keep that Japanese dog 
quiet in the Pacific.”69  It was clear from the start of his term that Churchill was going to do 
everything in his power to save Europe from Hitler.  He made his requests to Roosevelt at the 
risk of demanding too much too soon of a new friend.  Great Britain was desperate and needed 
help as soon as possible.  
The President responded by reminding Churchill that his requests would have to be 
vetted through Congress; however, he was working to get it pushed through the right channels.70 
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Perhaps Churchill understood Roosevelt’s desire to stop Hitler and he was able to use that to his 
advantage, but this was a gamble, and his gamble eventually paid off.  The budding relationship 
was taking root and as events continued to unfold, the two leaders continued to work together 
regardless of the official position of the United States.  However, President Roosevelt was still 
limited in what he could do to help the Allied cause.  The President concluded his letter, in 
response to Churchill’s requests, with the only thing he currently had to offer, words of 
encouragement.  On a separate line he wrote, “The best of luck to you.”71 
The rest of the month unfolded with little correspondence between the two.  Much had 
been taking place, however, on the European continent as Hitler pushed his troops westward into 
France.  By the middle of June the outlook for France had become very poor, and Churchill 
wrote several letters to the Roosevelt requesting greater assistance.  Roosevelt responded by 
praising the Prime Minister and ensuring him “that we are doing our utmost in the United States 
to furnish all the materiel and supplies which can possibly be released to the Allied 
Governments.”72 He added, because he feared his previous messages had been misinterpreted, 
that the United States would not go so far as to put troops into combat.  He then discussed a topic 
that would resurface throughout their correspondence; if an armistice were to be signed between 
Britain and Hitler the ships under the British Navy’s command must not go to the Axis powers, 
thus ensuring their American built ships would not be used against the United States in the 
future.  Roosevelt explained this in terms that were most certain to be received and understood 
by Churchill.  He wrote:  
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As naval people you and I fully appreciate the vital strength of the fleet in being, 
and command of the seas means in the long run the saving of democracy and the 
recovery of those suffering temporary reverses…On the other hand, if a general 
seeks an armistice for his land forces, he does not control or include the 
disposition of naval forces.73 
 
 Shortly after this letter France capitulated and signed an armistice with Germany.  A 
month would pass before Churchill sent another letter off to Roosevelt.  Then, it took another 
month for Roosevelt to respond, but he did so with good news.  He wrote, “It is my belief that it 
may be possible to furnish to the British Government as immediate assistance at least fifty 
destroyers.” 74  It would take some time, and there were stipulations that had to be agreed upon, 
but at this point, hope began to rise between these two leaders that they could work together to 
overcome the Axis powers.  Churchill responded by saying, “I need not tell you how cheered I 
am by your message or how grateful I feel for your untiring efforts to give us all possible help.”75 
 Roosevelt’s messages were more than a promise to furnish the British with the materials 
needed to fight the war; his words also encouraged Churchill and strengthened their relationship.  
Meanwhile, Churchill kept Roosevelt up to speed on what was happening in Europe and 
reassuring him that the U.S. warships would, under no condition, be handed over to the Germans.  
As the New Year began, Congress started debating how much support should be given to the 
British if the U.S. were to stay out of the war. 
In January of 1941, Congress addressed a bill that was expected to defend the United 
States by aiding the Allied Governments.  The bill would, if passed, provide any Allied nation 
the materials as well as money and foodstuffs, required to help them overcome the enemy.  The 
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greatest concern discussed during the debate was whether or not this bill could be used by the 
Axis powers to bring the United States into the war.  While interviewing Joseph Kennedy, a 
staunch anti-communist and ambassador to the United Kingdom, Representative James Shanley, 
from Connecticut, said to Mr. Kennedy “I am wondering how far we can travel along that narrow 
ledge without some day tripping and getting us in this conflict.”76  Kennedy agreed that the U.S. 
risked being dragged into the war, but believed help should still be given to the British 
Government.  He said, “There are advantages and disadvantages.  I think after long 
consideration, and I assure you I have slept and lived with this problem, thinking exactly how I 
felt about it, I think this is by far the least risk to run for the greatest good.”77  On the eleventh of 
March 1941 the Lend-Lease Bill, approved by Congress and signed by Roosevelt, went into 
effect.  The United States took a significant step toward supporting the war effort while 
simultaneously avoiding armed conflict by signing Lend-Lease. 
Barbarossa	to	Pearl	Harbor	
	
Eleven days before the Lend-Lease Bill was signed, events unfolded in Eastern Europe 
that would end up being more significant, arguably, than an agreement to increase support for the 
Allies.  Germany moved into Bulgaria on March 1.  At the beginning of the year, the Nazis and 
the Soviets had renewed their non-aggression pact, but their relationship had begun to fall apart.  
German troops had moved into Bulgaria, one step closer to the U.S.S.R., which caused great 
concern in the Soviet Union.  Once again, the concept of a buffer zone became the main concern 
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of the Soviets.  On March 1, 1941, Molotov sent a strongly worded message to the German 
Ambassador describing Soviet anxiety.  He said:  
It is regrettable that despite the warning given by the Soviet Government in the 
demarche of 25 November 1940, the Government of the German Reich deemed it 
possible to take the course of violating the security interests of the USSR and has 
decided to occupy Bulgaria militarily…the German Government must understand 
that it cannot count on support from the USSR for its actions in Bulgaria.78 
 
 On June 13th, the Soviet Union denied there were any hard feelings harbored between the 
Germany and the U.S.S.R in Izvestia.79 The report was part of the Soviet charade to cover up the 
uncertainty they felt about their relationship with Germany.  Nine days later, without warning, 
Operation Barbarossa commenced and German troops entered Soviet territory.  The fighting that 
followed was intense and the Soviet resistance valiant.  The number of lives lost battling for the 
heart of Russia, now estimated at 26-28 million, is unfathomable and most deplorable.  Little 
good can be said about it, but it did lead to the final piece of the puzzle; the Grand Alliance that 
would win the war was forced together by the man trying to overthrow them all.  Hitler’s own 
overzealous ambitions gave the Soviet Union no choice but to partner with Stalin’s ideological 
nemeses. 
 Winston Churchill was not slow to recognize the significance of Hitler turning on the 
Soviet Union.  Churchill, in his typical and moving style, made a speech declaring his support 
for the Soviet Union.  He stated, “Any man or State who fights against Nazism will have our aid.  
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Any man or State who marches with Hitler is our foe.”80 He then went on to encourage all the 
allies to support Russia as well.  Unlike Chamberlain, although under much different 
circumstances, Churchill was not going lose Stalin as a partner.  He recognized the importance of 
an Eastern front in terms of relief for the Western Allies as well as the significant role a force as 
large as the Soviet Union could be even if it only lasted, as many predicted, for only a few 
months against Hitler.  Stalin, encouraged by Churchill’s words, and before Roosevelt had made 
any statement of support for the Soviet Union, declared his hope for a future alliance that would 
defeat Hitler.  He stated: 
In this war of liberation we shall not be alone, we shall have faithful allies in the 
people of Europe and America, including the German people itself oppressed by 
Hitler's satraps. Our war for the freedom of our Fatherland is merged into the 
struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independent freedom. It is 
the united front of the peoples who stand for freedom and against the threat of 
enslavement by Hitler's Fascist armies.81  
 
 Stalin was confident that the United States was their partner in the fight against Hitler and 
would assist the U.S.S.R. in their fight against the Nazis.  The president, however, was limited 
by what he could do to help the Soviet Union.  He could not declare war to help, but he could do 
something else.  According to biographer Susan Butler, Roosevelt asked his cabinet what could 
be done to aid the Soviet Union since they had not been part of Lend-Lease, and he found his 
answer.  “Two days after the invasion Roosevelt released $39 million of frozen Russian 
assets.”82 The country as a whole may not have been behind Russia, but Roosevelt shared 
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Churchill’s opinion and was doing all he could to pass good will along to Stalin.  In his “Letter 
of Transmittal” to Congress regarding the Lend-Lease Act, the President addressed what was 
being done to help the Soviet Union.  He said, “The gallant resistance of the Russian people has 
been of enormous help to all peoples resisting the Nazi war machine…We are using the energies 
of our Government to make available supplies which are urgently needed by Russia.”83 
Interestingly, however, the president mentioned that the Soviet Union was, unlike Britain and 
other allied nations, paying for the wartime and war related components they were receiving 
from the United States.  In November, the U.S.S.R. was equally included in the Lend-Lease Act, 
which signified the creation of a mutual coalition.   
As political scientist Amos Perlmutter put it, “now the wily Stalin, whose war goals were 
clearly territorial, became the … ally of the Anglo-Americans, especially of President 
Roosevelt.”84 As reasonable as this statement was, it was made nearly fifty years after the war.  
At the time President Roosevelt was trying to rally American support for the war against Hitler 
and if he had to make a deal with a fox, or more precisely a bear, he was willing to do so and 
handle the consequences of this relationship later.   
Stalin’s new partnership with Roosevelt and Churchill, however, did not change the fact 
that his country was under attack.  During the first week of Barbarossa an unusual incident 
occurred.  Analyzing this event helps build an understanding of the authority Stalin held over the 
Soviet Union as well as show him at his lowest point of confidence during the war.  During the 
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initial onslaught of German attacks, Stalin was preoccupied with directing the order of battle and 
trying to defend territory under Soviet control.  However, less than a week after the attack Stalin 
suddenly disappeared from the Kremlin.  Chris Bellamy, professor of military science and 
doctrine, addressed the commonly accepted possibility that Stalin had a nervous breakdown in 
the immediate aftermath of Operation Barbarossa.  In the middle of the night after a day full of 
meetings Stalin apparently left the Kremlin and went to his dacha outside the city and stopped 
issuing orders.  Bellamy concluded that a breakdown was possible as well as understandable, but 
it was more likely that Stalin’s actions were theatrical.  He then compared Stalin’s actions to 
Ivan the Terrible who abdicated his throne twice, thereby forcing his nobles to request Ivan’s 
return after agreeing to his terms.  Bellamy’s argument was in line with Stalin’s paranoia 
described by biographer Dmitri Volkogonov, because Stalin’s decision-making skills were put 
into question when the Germans attacked.  Stalin certainly had reason to fear this would be the 
end of his tenure as Soviet leader.  His last option was to leave the Kremlin, with no designated 
leader left behind, and hope he would be asked to come back.  According to Bellamy, men were 




By the beginning of November 1941, two of the three nations that would form the Grand 
Alliance were actively fighting in the war.  However, all three nations were dedicated to one 
cause: the defeat of Axis Powers.  It would not be long before all three nations were ‘in the war.’ 
On November 26, 1941, Roosevelt wrote a letter to Churchill discussing Japan’s aggression in 
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China and his fear that the Chinese would be forced to surrender.86 In response, Churchill gave 
what can now only be seen as an eerie warning.  He recommended that the United States make a 
declaration that warned the Japanese “that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead 
immediately to the gravest consequences.”87 Seven days later was the ‘Day that will live in 
infamy.’    
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor drove the United States into the war whole-
heartedly.  The next morning Roosevelt sent two letters to Churchill informing him of the 
dedication the United States now had to their shared cause.  In his words, “Today all of us are in 
the same boat with you and the people of the Empire and it is a ship which will not and cannot be 
sunk.”88  Since Operation Barbarossa, Roosevelt had been in communication with Stalin, but 
their letters were predominantly limited to discussions of logistics and concerns about U.S. 
support for the Soviet Union.89 On December 14th, Roosevelt, determined to overcome Hitler, 
wrote to Stalin stressing the importance of a meeting between “Chinese, Soviet, British, Dutch 
and American representatives.”90 The meeting did not happen because Stalin had not received 
the message by the deadline set by Roosevelt for a response, but the alliance among Roosevelt, 
Churchill, and Stalin was being strengthened. Additional problems were bound to arise.  
Multilateral decisions have always been difficult to formulate on an international spectrum.  This 
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was especially true for the nations at hand. Nevertheless, all the pieces had come together. The 
Grand Alliance had been formed.  
The most significant events that unfolded between September of 1938 and December of 
1941 could not have been foreseen.  Leaders, such as Chamberlain, bent on preventing war, did 
more to aid Hitler in his quest for European domination than they did to stop it.  Versailles had 
been a tremendous failure before Chamberlain tried to conquer world peace himself.  As the 
Bible reads, and Abraham Lincoln famously repeated, ‘a house divided cannot stand.’ The global 
community was not able to prevent Hitler’s aggression because of the fracturing that had not 
been properly repaired after World War I. 
By the middle of 1941 the British Empire was struggling to survive and willing to work 
with anyone that could help slow Hitler’s advances.  The Soviet Union, at that same time, had 
been mercilessly stabbed in the back by the Germans and would do whatever it took to eject the 
Germans from their territory and push them back to Berlin.  The United States was not engaged 
in conflict but had irrefutably decided which side she supported.  It was at that point hope began 
to emerge among Hitler’s opponents. 
The only way the world could defeat the Axis powers was to form a coalition of capable 
nations.  It was an ironic turn of events that the three countries that formed the coalition could 
not have been further apart at the beginning of the war.  However, times of extreme necessity are 
often overcome by extraordinary means.  This was certainly the case by the time the United 
States entered the war. The tripartite relationship that defeated Nazi Germany, which prior to 
1941 seemed preposterous to imagine because each nation was pursing individual interests that 
conflicted with the others, was firmly established by the beginning of 1942.  It was not a perfect 
relationship because the leader of each nation still had his own interests at hand that led to 
  44 
concern and suspicions of the other members, particularly between the two capitalist leaders and 
the one communist leader.  These fears would have long-term effects both during the rest of the 
war, and for decades to follow. On the bright side, for the first time since the beginning of the 
war, the possibility of victory seemed more likely than the overwhelming fear of defeat because 
Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin were beginning to work together. 
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CHAPTER	2:	NORMALIZING	THE	RELATIONSHIP	
The years 1942 and 1943 were years of mutual dependency among the Allies.  The Soviet 
Union depended on her allies for survival.  The British and Americans had made progress in 
Africa but depended on the Red Army as a fighting force to distract Hitler while they grabbed a 
foothold in Europe and amassed the troops and equipment required to adequately enter the 
interior of Europe.  The United States Air Force has borrowed Bruce Tuckman’s “Stages of 
Development” to explain relationship building within its units.  There is not an officer or airman 
who cannot recite the four main stages in their sleep: Forming, Storming, Norming [sic] and 
Performing.  These terms relate to how a group of people comes together and works through 
their differences in order to form a productive unified body dedicated to fulfilling their goal.  The 
Grand Alliance was formed out of necessity and maintained by mutual dependency, but this 
dependency required an excessive amount of storming before it was normalized. And “normal” 
is a relative concept in this context.  The spring of 1942 was marked by setbacks for the Allies in 
both Europe and the Pacific.  Communication among the three was minimal as each leader had to 
assess his position.  The U.S., recently attacked and officially in the war, had to begin raising and 
moving troops.  The British, grateful to have a new ally, were not making sufficient gains on 
their own, and the Soviet Union was struggling to survive.  The first milestone to normalizing the 
relationship required forming an official Alliance. 
Anglo-Soviet	Alliance	
	
As the summer of 1942 approached, six months since the U.S. officially had entered the 
war, little progress had been made on the front lines.  Germany still controlled most of Europe, 
the Mediterranean, and North Africa.  Axis forces were deeply embedded in Soviet territory and 
there was concern that the Soviets might be forced to sign another treaty with Hitler to avoid 
  46 
extermination.  In this dark hour, The Times in London reported on June 12, 1942, “Mr. Eden 
was cheered repeatedly by a crowded House of Commons when he rose to-day [sic] to announce 
the conclusion of the treaty between the Russian and British Governments.”91  The Alliance was 
a guarantee that neither country would abandon the other in their pursuit of victory.  
Interestingly, the majority of The Times article was dedicated to discussing the postwar 
world.  It began with “The two countries also agree that they will, when peace is re-established, 
work together for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe.”92 The author 
recognized the significance of a ‘Twenty-Year Treaty with Russia’ as the essential element 
needed to ensure victory.  The author ran with the concept, which he described as both welcomed 
and a relief.  The Anglo-Soviet Alliance was an agreement that took the better part of six months 
to come to fruition.  If victory was the common goal, why did it take six months to come to an 
agreement? The need for active cooperation was undeniably immediate, even urgent. Yet still the 
Allies devoted half a year to overcoming disagreements before they could sign an alliance 
agreement. The problems that plagued the Grand Alliance at the end of the war were the same 
ones that plagued them at the beginning.  The most prevalent problems in 1942 were a second 
front and postwar boundaries.   
 The Soviet Union had been led by a vanguard of the proletariat under Lenin; however, 
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under Stalin it had become a “Communist autocracy.”93  Historian Derek Watson argued Stalin 
was the sole author of Soviet foreign policy, but that he was greatly influenced by Molotov who 
had considerable leeway to work with other nations.94 Stalin’s faith in Molotov was essential to 
his interaction with the West.  While Stalin communicated through his correspondence with 
Roosevelt and Churchill, he did not meet Churchill until August of 1942, after the Anglo-Soviet 
Treaty had been signed, and he did not meet with Roosevelt until the Tehran Conference in 1943.  
Molotov was therefore the mouthpiece for Stalin when he interacted with Roosevelt and 
Churchill.  While Secretaries Hall and Eden interacted with Stalin as well, Molotov was perhaps 
the most central figure amongst all negotiators who helped guide the negotiations of the Grand 
Alliance.  Despite the importance Watson placed on Molotov, he concluded Molotov only 
pursued the policy Stalin instructed him to pursue.  As the top negotiator for Stalin in 1941 and 
1942, Molotov had the difficult task of convincing Roosevelt and Churchill to accede to Stalin’s 
requirements for the Anglo-Soviet Treaty. 
 As the three powers worked to normalize relations they faced two issues that challenged 
their alliance and prevented the treaty from being signed before the middle of 1942.  The first 
was the opening of a second front, and the second was determining postwar boundaries.  During 
the negotiations to conclude the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, Molotov flew to Britain, the United States, 
and back to Britain to complete the treaty.  While the treaty was specifically between the British 
and the Soviets, the two nations recognized they needed the approval of the United States in 
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order to ensure mutual assistance in the future.  Thus, Molotov had to travel first to the United 
Kingdom to come to an agreement with Churchill, then fly to the U.S. to get Roosevelt’s 
approval before heading back to the U.K. to sign the treaty. A record of Molotov’s meeting with 
Roosevelt stated, “Molotov said he had been informed that Roosevelt was not sympathetic to the 
article in the former drafts of the Soviet-British treaty which mentioned Soviet frontiers.”95 
Roosevelt’s response revealed another issue that emerged among the Big Three. “Roosevelt 
replied that indeed he did not want the question of frontiers mentioned in the treaty, in view of 
US public opinion.  He believed that a proper moment should be found to raise this question, but 
it had not come yet.”96  
 Roosevelt, leader of a democratic nation, had cited not the interests of the people who 
would be subjugated to Soviet rule during a possible redistribution of land at the end of the war, 
but rather to U.S. public opinion as the reason he refused Molotov’s request.   In 2009 Anna 
Cienciala, a historian who wrote extensively on Polish issues during World War II, argued that 
President Roosevelt had agreed shortly after the bombing of Pearl Harbor to give the Soviet 
Union the 1941 border it desired, which incorporated much of Poland, when the war was over.97 
However, this part of her argument was flawed because the Soviet documents found in Stalin’s 
archives and presented by Olga Rzheshevsky prove Roosevelt was not willing to hand the Polish 
people over to the Soviets in 1942, let alone shortly after Pearl Harbor had been attacked.   
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Anne McCormic, contemporary columnist for the New York Times, wrote an article on 
the Anglo-Soviet Treaty a day after Mr. Eden’s speech to the House of Commons was published 
in The New York Times in which she argued President Roosevelt prevented any mention of 
postwar boundaries in the treaty.  However, she was under the impression that Mr. Churchill was 
willing to concede to Stalin’s desire that the western border of the Soviet Union be established in 
the treaty.98  The final draft of the treaty did not mention any borders.  Neither the United States 
nor the United Kingdom remained steadfast in all their positions toward the Soviet Union, but 
their positions were not as clear-cut as Ciencela and McCormic argued.  Each leader recognized 
the importance of keeping the Soviet Union on his side because victory without the Soviet Union 
seemed impossible, and Churchill and Roosevelt were willing to rethink and reword their 
positions to find a compromise that kept all parties at the negotiating table throughout the war.  
Stalin was in the same position and was committed to saving the Soviet Union in the midst of the 
German onslaught.   
 Since the negotiations that had taken place in the midst of the Munich Agreement, Stalin 
had been working with and through Molotov to defend the physical security of the Soviet Union 
and, when possible, increase the Soviet Empire’s territory.   Historian Richard Overy argued that 
Stalin’s desire was to build the Soviet Union to the size and scale of the Russian Empire.  
Referencing the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Overy wrote, “Above all Germany offered something 
the Soviet Union could only dream about in 1939: the possibility of rebuilding the old Tsarist 
empire in Europe.”99 Throughout the war Stalin worked to take advantage of strategic and 
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ideological weaknesses to expand the influence of the Soviet Union into Europe, particularly 
Poland.  In the late spring of 1942, however, his greatest concern was the immediate survival of 
the Soviet Union.   
Stalin’s desires were sidelined by his needs when final negotiations over the Anglo-
Soviet Treaty commenced.  On the night of May 29, 1942, Roosevelt and Molotov discussed the 
possibility of opening a second front in 1942.  Roosevelt informed him at the time there were not 
enough transport ships to support a full-scale invasion, but that there was a possibility “of 
landing 6-10 divisions in Europe.”100 By revealing both the inability to open a successful second 
front, and his desire to land some troops in France despite the likelihood of failure, Roosevelt 
was doing what he could to keep Molotov’s faith that the U.S. would support the Soviet Union in 
every way they could.  Roosevelt went on to show Molotov the sacrifice he was willing to make 
in support of the Soviet struggle; “It is possible that we shall have to live through another 
Dunkirk and lose 100,000-200,000 men.  Nonetheless…it would ease the situation and raise the 
spirit of the Red Army even higher.”101 Roosevelt’s comment was very interesting, because he 
had previously refused to negotiate boundaries of other nations due to public opinion, but it was 
clear he was willing to sacrifice a few hundred thousand lives for the sake of encouraging the 
Soviets.   
 On June 9, 1942, Molotov met with Churchill and discussed the meeting he had hadwith 
Roosevelt.  The conversation brought out two significant points. The first was the idea to land 
troops in Europe to distract the Germans despite the likelihood that they would be lost.  Churchill 
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argued against the plan; he refused to have another Dunkirk on his hands.  Molotov then 
discussed the postwar world.  He informed Churchill that Roosevelt believed all nations should 
be disarmed with the exception of the four policing sates.  Apparently, this was news to 
Churchill who quickly remarked on the unlikelihood that it would be possible to disarm all 
nations.  Clearly, there were miscommunications among the three powers.  Additionally, the 
interaction between Molotov and Roosevelt followed by the one between Molotov and Churchill 
shows the alliance had problems that resulted from wartime planning and postwar interests.102 In 
the end, the cross-channel plan was postponed until the odds of success were greatly increased.   
 The boundary/second front discussions continued among Roosevelt, Molotov, and 
Churchill, with Molotov reporting back to Stalin until someone yelled uncle.  During the 
negotiations, conditions in the Soviet Union became much worse, and some form of assistance 
was required regardless of the cost. According to historian Remi Naedau, “A second front in the 
west to draw German divisions from the Russian front was far more critical than British 
recognition of frontiers.”103   
During this time Molotov received a note from Moscow that showed how the declining 
position in the Soviet Union had been further exacerbated since he had left the United States for 
Britain.  The note read, “It is necessary to work out quickly and submit to us the draft of the joint 
communiqué with Britain.  This communiqué must include, besides the question of the Treaty 
[sic], also the questions of the second front in Europe and war supplies to the USSR.”104 Watson 
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showed the gravity of the situation when he discussed a letter from Stalin to Molotov.  The letter 
informed Molotov that he was expected to sign the treaty as long as there was an agreement that 
a second front would be opened and to forget about the Polish border issue for the time being.105 
Did this mean Stalin was willing to forget about the boundary issue altogether for the sake of 
survival, or did Stalin hope to be in a better position to present his plan in the future?  
 English historian David Reynolds presented an argument in 2002 in which he presented 
Stalin’s two main objectives for his alliance with Roosevelt and Churchill.  Reynolds’s first 
argument supports the majority of historians and the idea that territorial security was Stalin’s 
primary objective.106 Reynolds’s second point presented Stalin as a man of great forethought.  
Reynolds believed that Stalin wanted to sign the alliance without mention of boundaries to keep 
in good graces with Roosevelt and Churchill, so that he would have a better bargaining position 
at the end of the war.107 Once a second front was agreed upon, and the survival of the Soviet 
Union was more certain, Stalin would be able to readdress boundary issues. Even if Stalin’s 
decision to postpone the boundaries discussion was done begrudgingly, it was a wise decision.  
Therefore the boundary issue was temporarily postponed, and the Grand Alliance drew strength 
from its temporary unity.  The three leaders were able to release a sigh of relief.  The agreement 
was finalized and the alliance was able to press on toward victory.   
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The sense of elation was heralded in the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United 
States.  From Moscow, Ralph Parker, writer for the New York Times, cabled to the U.S. a story 
proclaiming the joy that filled Moscow with the signing of an agreement between the United 
States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union that had occurred three weeks prior in May of 1942.  
This certainly gave the Russians a great morale boost after months of devastating blows from the 
German invaders.  Parker stated, “It is impossible for any one outside Russia to understand the 
sacrifices these people made during the past Winter [Sic].  Even Russians, now looking back at 
those heavy days, wonder at their own endurance.”108 In London, The Times proclaimed, “The 
Anglo-Soviet treaty of Alliance was published in all the free countries of the world yesterday, 
and was heard by the enslaved people of Europe…Few treaties have been more widely or more 
warmly welcomed.”109  Finally, in the U.S. the treaty was referred to as “a document of 
transcendent importance.”110  However, despite the outpouring of joy and hope by the press, the 
friction that delayed the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty had only been temporarily ignored.  
There was more to come that would strain the Grand Alliance. 
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As soon as an agreement had been made between the British and the Soviets reality set 
in.  Churchill and Roosevelt quickly realized they had to go back on their word, which could 
alienate Stalin putting the Alliance in jeopardy.  The Anglo-Soviet Treaty had promised a second 
front that was expected to open in western France in 1942.  Shortly after Molotov returned to 
Moscow, Churchill began reworking his war plans.  His new plans were not exactly what Stalin 
had wanted or been planning on during their negotiations.  In early July, Churchill wrote to 
Roosevelt that he believed “premature action in 1942 while probably ending in disaster would 
decisively injure the prospect of well-organised [sic] large-scale action in 1943.”111  He then 
went on to argue that Gymnast, the code name before Torch for the North African invasion, 
would have a better chance for success and help the Russians more than a failure in France.  
With Roosevelt’s approval, Churchill went to Moscow to inform Stalin of the news that he was 
postponing a second front in Europe for an invasion of North Africa and then the 
Mediterranean.112 
By the time Churchill went to Moscow he had Roosevelt’s support, but this had not 
always been the case.   According to Brian Farrell, Professor of History at National University of 
Singapore, the British war plan was to ‘wear down’ the Germans by keeping pressure on the 
periphery of the Axis Powers.  The United States, however, wanted to get onto the mainland as 
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soon as possible and confront Germany directly.113  Historian Mark Stoler argued in 2000 that 
U.S. military planners, and specifically Eisenhower, believed a campaign in North Africa was a 
‘sideshow’ and not ‘politically motivated’ and not helpful to the European or Pacific causes.  He 
referred to the British plan as ‘peripheral strategy.’114 However, U.S. planners had not yet 
designed a comprehensive plan as an alternative and had to yield to the British.   
On the 12th of August, the day Churchill left for Moscow, Stalin signed and sent a letter 
that became the primary topic of their time together. In the letter Stalin complained that the 
Anglo-Soviet treaty called for a second front.  He then wrote, “It will be readily understood that 
the British Government’s refusal to open a second front in Europe in 1942 delivers a moral blow 
to Soviet public opinion, which had hoped that the second front would be opened, [and] 
complicates the position of the Red Army…”115  Churchill responded by stating, “The best 
second front in 1942, and the only large-scale operation possible from the Atlantic, is 
‘Torch.’…No promise has been broken by Great Britain or the United States.”116 During their 
meeting in Moscow an amicable conversation developed.  Negotiations throughout the day had 
been unfavorable for both parties.  After dinner, however, Churchill had been invited to Stalin’s 
private quarters for conversation, which ended at three in the morning.  During the meeting, 
                                                
113 See Brian P. Farrell, "Symbol of paradox: The Casablanca Conference, 1943." Canadian 
Journal Of History 28, no. 1 (April 1993): 21. Academic Search Complete, EBSCOhost 
(accessed July 17, 2015), 24. 
 
114 See Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and 
U.S. Strategy in Wolrd War II (Chapel HIll: The University of Norht Carolina, 2000), 71-72. 
 
115 Joseph V. Stalin, Document Number 65, 13 August 1942, in Stalin's Correspondence with 
Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman: 1941-1945. Translated by Foreign Languages 
Publishing House and Moscow. (New York: E.P. Dutton An Co., Inc., 1958), 1:60-61. 
 
116 Winston S. Churchill, Document Number 66, 14 August 1942, in Stalin's Correspondence, 1: 
61-63. 
 
  56 
Stalin and Churchill came to a favorable agreement in which Operation Torch was given Stalin’s 
blessing during 1942 and the second front was moved to 1943.117 
The camaraderie established in Stalin’s residence put Churchill in an advantageous 
position over Stalin for the time being.  Through the next month, Churchill wrote to Stalin three 
more times discussing Operation Torch.  In the letters there was no mention of a second front 
and no complaint from Stalin that one had not been planned.  On September 7, 1942, one month 
prior to the landing on North Africa, Stalin wrote a brief letter to Churchill and ended it with, “I 
wish you success in the operation against Rommel in Egypt and all success in ‘Torch.’”118  As 
long as the Red Army remained committed to the fight, Churchill and Roosevelt held all the 
bargaining chips.  The Soviet Union was still desperate for the support Lend-Lease provided and 
had to accept a submissive role in the Grand Alliance.  Additionally, the U.S.S.R.’s only options 
were to continue fighting for survival while waiting for a second front in Europe, or submit to the 
Germans and accept defeat.  Stalin had to bide his time and wait until he had the upper hand. 
On November 24, 1942, Churchill wrote Stalin; in his letter he attempted to further 
postpone a second front in West Europe.  His letter to Stalin explained the advantage of 
additional military actions in the Mediterranean.  It also discussed a plan to bring Turkey into the 
war on the side of the allies in order to secure the Mediterranean for safe navigation of the 
military.  He wrote, “We can bring the war home to Mussolini and his Fascist gang with an 
intensity not yet possible” and concluded by stating, “The glorious news of your offensive is 
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streaming in.  We are watching it with breathless attention.  Every good wish.”119  Churchill’s 
comments suggesting a move via Italy to the Balkans, devoid of any mention of a second front in 
Western Europe, were certainly planned to encourage Stalin without promising anything that 
would tie U.S. and Britain a second front before they were prepared.  Churchill was universally 
recognized for his use of English prose to muster up the courage and support of the British 
people and troops during the war, but he was equally well versed in the use of prose when it 
came to diplomatic correspondence.  Every word, translated for and reread by Stalin, had the 
potential to strengthen or ruin the relationship Churchill was building with Stalin.  Clearly 
Churchill was trying his best to salvage the relationship while denying Stalin’s most ardent 
request, nay demand, ‘a second front must be opened!’  Stalin, a poor public speaker according 
to biographer Dmitri Volkogonov, was sharp enough to read between the lines and see that 
Churchill was attempting to circumvent the topic of a second front in Western Europe.120  On 
November 27, 1942 Stalin wrote: 
Thank you for your message…I fully share your view that it is highly important to 
promote our personal relations…I agree with you and President Roosevelt 
concerning the desirability of doing everything to bring Turkey into the war on 
our side in the spring.  That, without a doubt, would mean a great deal for the 
speedy defeat of Hitler and his accomplices…I have carefully read your 
communication saying that you and the Americans are continuing the preparations 
along your southeastern and southern coasts in order to keep the Germans pinned 
in Pas de Calais, etc., That, I hope, does not imply renunciation of your Moscow 
promise to open a second front in Western Europe in the spring of 1943.121 
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Churchill did not respond to Stalin’s comment on the second front until Stalin 
specifically requested a reply.  Churchill did so by stating, “In your message to me of November 
27th in the last sentence of paragraph 5 and also in your message of December 6th, you ask 
specifically about a second front in 1943.  I am not able to reply to this question except jointly 
with the President of the United States.”122  Over a year had passed since the United States had 
been bombed by Japan, and a year and a half had passed since Germany had attacked the Soviet 
Union.  Winston Churchill promised to aid the Soviet Union in every way possible.  In the minds 
of the British and the Americans every step had been taken to support the Soviet Union as long 
as the chance of failure for the allies was minimal.  To Stalin, however, not enough had been 
done to fulfill previous promises.   
Each position was rational.  The Soviet Union had been under invasion for nearly 
eighteen months, while Britain and the United States had suffered air attacks but remained safe 
when compared to German attempts to exterminate the Communist Slavs.  On the other hand, 
even if Roosevelt was willing to suffer a loss of 100-200,000 men, Churchill greatly feared 
another Dunkirk and knew the damage a loss of such great proportion could inflict on the morale 
of the military as well as the civilian public.  Churchill did not want to lose an ally, but he was 
willing to do his best to postpone a Western European invasion until it was absolutely necessary 
and chances of survival were as high as they could be.   
Tense	Times	Among	Friends	
	
The predominantly smooth relationship between the United States and Britain began to 
show strains at the Casablanca Conference in January of 1943.  During the negotiations among 
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the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States, Molotov had tried to pit his draft of the 
treaty with Churchill that mentioned Soviet borders against Roosevelt’s plan.  His plan failed, 
but inconsistencies between Roosevelt and Churchill began to emerge shortly afterwards.  
During the Casablanca conference Churchill and his military advisors wanted to access Europe 
through the Mediterranean and continue knocking Hitler out in the Balkans.  Roosevelt, 
conversely, felt a need to fulfill his promise to Stalin.  Furthermore, Roosevelt’s military 
advisors wanted to engage the enemy head on and with full force on mainland Europe. 
An interesting first hand account of the negotiations that took place at Casablanca helps 
bring a clearer understanding of how the difference of opinions began to wear on the relationship 
between the U.S. and U.K.  General Jacob E. Smart was on General Arnold’s staff during World 
War II.  He was also a German prisoner of war after being shot down flying a B-17.  While on 
General Arnold’s staff, Smart accompanied the Chief of Staff of the Army Air Force to 
Casablanca for the conference as an advisor.  Smart later wrote an article for Air Power History 
that presented a few interesting bits of information.  First, as historians such as Farrell and Stoler 
have pointed out, Smart recalled, “British thinking stemmed from the determination to preserve 
the British Empire … at the least cost in human terms, notably British personnel…[and] The 
British Chiefs of Staff came prepared to defend their requirements for American aircraft, 
armaments, equipment, supplies, and for support in training.”123   
Smart also included the decisions made at Casablanca.  The most significant was timing 
for the second front.  He concluded eight decisions were made for operations in 1943 leading 
through the invasion of Sicily.  Among the decisions made he recalled one was “to plan the 
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invasion of France in 1944.”124  The military leaders at Casablanca even, according to Smart, 
planned the invasion specifically for June 6.  Smart’s statement was significant because, if 
accurate, it would validate the argument that the British and Americans, specifically Churchill 
and Roosevelt, were using the promise of a second front as a carrot to keep Stalin moving 
forward in the direction the Anglo-American plan was heading.  After the conclusion of the 
Casablanca Conference, Churchill wrote to Stalin promising a second front in August or 
September of 1943. Was Churchill lying to Stalin? 
According to State Department records, the Casablanca Conference did not conclude that 
a second front would not happen in 1943, but the records did indicate an invasion of France 
would require a miraculous event in order to occur then.  Discussions between the Joint Chiefs 
and Joint Planning Staff continuously mentioned the desire to relieve the Red Army and place 
troops in Western Europe.  However, they recognized that if Husky were to be successful, the 
troops transport vehicles required in Sicily would take away from those required for an invasion 
of France.  Therefore, the answer was provided in vague terms.  On January 22, 1943, the British 
Joint Planning Staff concluded: 
 With the resources available in 1943, neither the size of the seaborne and 
airborne assault forces nor the rate of build up can approach the requirements of 
the Combined Commanders.  It is clear, therefore, that no operation to seize and 
hold a footing in the Cotentin Peninsula has any prospect of success unless the 
German reserves have been very greatly reduced.  Similar considerations would 
apply to a limited operation anywhere on the French Coast… Unless the Germans 
are forced to reduce their reserves and their beach defenses in Northwest Europe 
substantially, no limited operation to seize and hold a footing in France is 
practicable with the resources likely to be available in 1943.125  
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 Two days later, at the conclusion of the conference, Churchill and Roosevelt 
prepared a statement for the press that was incredibly vague.  It addressed the problems facing 
the Soviet Union and implied a second front was being prepared.  However, it clearly acted as 
another action by the Anglo-American alliance to keep the bear hoping, all the while not 
committing them to a hard date.  The report stated: 
The President and the Prime Minister realized to the full the enormous 
weight of the war which Russia is successfully bearing along her whole land 
front, and their prime object has been to draw as much of the weight as possible 
off the Russian Armies by engaging the enemy as heavily as possible at the best 
selected points.126 
 
As vague and noncommittal as the statement may have been, it also revealed a hidden 
meaning.  The Allies needed the Soviet Union, and as weak as the Soviet Union’s position may 
have been up to this point, Roosevelt and Churchill needed to keep the Red Army alive.  In order 
to protect their adversarial ally they were willing to go to great lengths to help. While 1943 
would not bring the promised second front in western Europe, it would bring a British and 
American contribution of a very different sort: willingness to cover up Soviet atrocities to protect 
the alliance and the hope of victory. 
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Soviet victory at the Battle of Stalingrad was a critical moment in the war that would 
reshape the balance of power within the Grand Alliance.  It lasted nearly six months and cost the 
lives of between 1.5 and 2 million soldiers and civilians.  If one tried to conceive the loss of life 
beyond mere facts and figures on a page it would be unfathomable, yet for the Soviet Union, the 
loss of life was not in vain.  From that point on the Red Army was no longer on the defensive.  
The German invaders had been broken; it proved to be only a matter of time until Soviet forces 
reclaimed their lost territory and pushed farther west.  Historian Warren F. Kimball accurately 
argued, “Keeping the Soviets in the war had been a concern in American assessments during 
1942, but the emphasis in that year had been on Soviet capabilities.  In 1943 the emphasis 
shifted to intentions.”127 Before the war began there was concern that Communism, if left 
undeterred, had the potential to spread beyond the Soviet borders.  Once the Red Army defeated 
Hitler’s forces at Stalingrad Roosevelt and Churchill realized the spread of Communism, as an 
ideology, was not their only concern.  It became clear that the Soviet Union had the potential to 
spread their physical domain in addition to their ideological beliefs throughout Europe.   
The tremendous loss of life and subsequent victory proved the resilience of the Slavic 
people.  It also showed, for the first time, the capabilities of the Red Army.  When Stalingrad 
began, the losses suffered by the Soviet Union were overwhelming and the Germans came within 
fifty miles of Moscow, but under Georgy Zhukov they fought back from the verge of ethnic 
extermination.  Churchill and Roosevelt understood that when the Red Army expelled the last 
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German soldiers from their homeland, and took the offensive, there would be little that could 
stop them from reaching Berlin.   
In addition to recognizing that the Red Army would, in time, occupy vast areas of Eastern 
Europe as they approached Berlin, Roosevelt and Churchill must have recognized the subtle but 
alarming difference between the ways Stalin addressed his concerns prior to February 2, 1943 
and after his victory at Stalingrad.  For example, in October of 1942 Stalin wrote to Roosevelt 
explaining the needs of the Soviet Union and the ever-increasing demand for war materials.  
However, his request was humble and passive.  He wrote, “Availing myself of the opportunity to 
send you a personal message afforded by Mr. Standley proceeding to Washington, I would like 
to express a few considerations to the military supplies from the United States to the USSR.”128  
His gratitude, after receiving some of the material he had requested was equally polite.  His letter 
to Roosevelt in early January of 1943 stated: “Please accept my appreciation of your willingness 
to send 100 bombers for the Soviet Union to the Far East.”129  Even in regard to the second front 
Stalin’s words show he recognized he needed to remain respectful toward his allies to ensure he 
did not offend them during his time of need.  He penned these words to Roosevelt in regard to 
opening a second front sometime in 1943, “I should be very obliged to you for information on 
the concrete operations planned in this respect and on the scheduled time of their realization.”130 
 Immediately after the Red Army’s victory at Stalingrad, Stalin was able to change his 
attitude toward the war and toward the other members of the Grand Alliance.  The Soviet Union 
was no longer fighting purely for survival.  The enemy was still on their native soil, but the turn 
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of events at and around Stalingrad helped reassure Stalin that the Allies were going to be 
victorious and that he could start negotiating like a victor, rather than someone in desperate need 
of assistance.  His first letter to Roosevelt, after victory at Stalingrad, one that wasn’t related to 
thanks for his victory, demanded an explanation for Churchill and Roosevelt’s decision to delay 
actions in Tunisia.  The change in tone from January 30, to February 16, 1943 was apparent.  
“There is no need to prove at length how undesirable is this postponement of operations against 
the Germans and Italians.  Precisely at this particular moment…the activities of Anglo-American 
troops in Northern Africa are imperatively essential.”131   One last comparison shows the 
complete change of tactics Stalin used when writing to his allies.  The second front, which Stalin 
had meekly requested information on in January, was readdressed in another letter penned on 
February 16, 1943.  In this letter Stalin demanded action on the second front.  He wrote, 
“Nevertheless, I think I must give a most emphatic warning, in the interest of our common cause, 
of the grave danger with which further delay in opening a second front in France is fraught.”132  
Stalingrad was a victory that changed the way the Big Three interacted for the rest of the war. 
The West had to begin weighing which of their objectives were most critical to postwar 
plans and which they could compromise to ensure their objectives were accomplished.  Stalin 
was still not in a position to demand his own terms in negotiations, because he still needed the 
second front, but there were immediate repercussions from the Red Army’s victory at Stalingrad. 
Within two months of German surrender in Stalingrad, the British and U.S. had to concede 
Stalin’s expanded power in the crisis over the discoveries in Katyn forest near Smolensk. 
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Katyn	Massacre	
	
Historically, politicians have been recognized as compromising in values in order to 
achieve their objectives.  War certainly heightened the magnitude of concessions politicians were 
willing to make to beat Hitler.  In April of 1943 the Big Three denied a request by the Polish 
Government-in-Exile that the International Red Cross be permitted to investigate the discovery 
of mass graves containing the remains of Polish Soldiers in the Katyn Forest on Soviet territory.  
Their decision further cemented their relationship, proving loyalty to one another for the greater 
good, regardless of the moral implications of their actions.  The request of the Polish 
Government-in-exile was based on an incident that had occurred in 1940, but whose details only 
the Soviet state knew.  This action also supplemented Stalin’s growing ability to manipulate any 
situation and use the mire of war and an unholy relationship to take advantage of Churchill and 
Roosevelt.  The Polish request was that the Red Cross be permitted to look into the mysterious 
disappearance of some 15,000 Polish officers from the Katyn Forest in Russia.  Susan Butler 
described the beginning of the situation in this way: “As the Germans retreated in April 1943, 
they announced that they had found the bodies…and charged that the Russians had killed them 
in 1940.  The Soviet Union countered with charges that the officers had been killed by the 
Germans in 194l.”133  The incident would later become known as the Katyn Massacre.   
 When the Polish Government-in-exile learned of the whereabouts of the bodies they 
requested an International Red Cross investigation, which the Big Three stonewalled.  Stalin 
immediately refused the request and threatened to cut off relations with the Polish Government-
in-Exile.  He then sent a request to Roosevelt for help in squelching the request.  Whether or not 
Roosevelt believed the Russians at the time of the request is uncertain, but his response shows 
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his dedication to finding a diplomatic response that was meant to satisfy Stalin despite the 
possibility that he was helping with a cover up. Roosevelt’s response was: “I can well understand 
your problem…I am inclined to think that Churchill will find ways and means of getting the 
Polish Government in London to act with more common sense in the future.”134   
 Roosevelt’s actions were intended to protect the alliance, but they also had dramatic 
consequences.  Roosevelt, like Churchill, believed it was important to maintain a unified front 
both diplomatically and publicly to prevent the seeds of doubt from finding their way into this 
perilous relationship and threatening its future. Stalin understood this as well and emphasized the 
collective goal.  He responded by writing, “I, too, believe that Premier Churchill will find a way 
to bring the Polish Government to reason and to help it in future to act according to the dictates 
of common sense.”135  Stalin knew far too well how to work the well being of the collective over 
any individual, and he emphasized it here.  In this case, his war partners were all too quick to 
work with him.  
While sending his remarks to Stalin, Roosevelt sent a copy to Churchill, who was able to 
put a spin on it and convince the Polish Government-in-Exile to change the tune of the 
investigation to one that would be less condemning.  As he phrased it, “You will see that we 
have persuaded them to shift the argument from the dead to the living and from the past to the 
future.”136  Not only did Churchill believe he was helping the immediate cause; he believed this 
action would provide unity in the postwar effort.  He proceeded to declare, “I and my colleagues 
look steadily to the ever closer cooperation and understanding of the U.S.S.R., and the U.S.A., 
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and the British Commonwealth and Empire, not only in the deepening war struggle but after the 
war.”137   
Three questions must be addressed to understand how the Katyn Forest Massacre 
influenced the relationship of the Big Three and tied Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s hands in future 
negotiations with Stalin.  The first question is why would Stalin authorize the execution of 
prisoners of war?  The second question is what evidence was provided to Roosevelt and 
Churchill in 1943 that these atrocities were committed by the Soviet Union?  The third question 
is why did Roosevelt and Churchill agree to block further investigation into the deaths of so 
many Polish officers and civilians if Britain had gone to war to defend Poland in 1939?  The 
answers to these questions shed light on one of the most controversial topics of ethics in war and 
wartime relationships during World War II.   
 Since the rise of the Bolshevik Party as the dominant party in Soviet Russia through the 
end of Stalin’s life, it was standard practice to minimize and eliminate dissidents.  Lenin argued 
in 1921 about the importance of party unity.  He believed anyone who was not for the party was 
against the party and slowed the progress of Communism.138  Under Stalin, the Soviet Union 
underwent several political purges to eliminate anyone who could have questioned his authority.  
For example, Stalin authorized show trials, the elimination of kulaks (petty bourgeoisie peasants, 
often of little actual threat to the party), and even a purge of the Communist Party to prevent 
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opposition and promote his authority throughout the Soviet Union.139  Stalin’s actions against his 
own people provided the template for how he would treat the people of nations he intended to 
annex during and after the war.  Stalin’s plan to acquire Polish territory after the war motivated 
him to eliminate elements of the Polish population who could oppose his authority after the war.  
Stalin gained the opportunity to eliminate Polish opposition when the Red Army occupied 
Poland in 1939 under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and began rounding up Polish prisoners of 
war.   
In April of 1943, members of the Polish Red Cross had been invited by German 
authorities to investigate the mass graves at Katyn.140  They worked from mid-April to June 1943 
and concluded the executions were carried out in 1940.141  The British Ambassador to the Polish 
Government-in-exile Owen O’Malley, who had been given a copy of the initial report but did not 
see the massacre site first hand, wrote a letter to Anthony Eden and described what the report 
detailed.  He also offered his opinion.  In his letter O’Malley explained quite bluntly why he 
believed the murder of prisoners of war had occurred.  O’Malley compared the Polish officers to 
horses, considering them ‘good breeding stock’ that Stalin wanted to get rid of so they could not 
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“live to sire a herd of hostile Christian thoroughbreds.”142  His description was vivid and almost 
morbid, but it provided a logical rationale for why Stalin chose to eliminate prisoners of war 
when they were of no immediate threat.  In fact, Stalin had done the same thing when he insisted 
on exiling or imprisoning the Soviet wives and children of men he deemed “enemies of the 
people” in the late 1930s.143   
The massacre and cover up were simple actions for Stalin to eliminate many of Poland’s 
best men.  These men could have been the most capable leaders to oppose Stalin after the war.144  
Concealing the evidence seemed simple enough.  In the haste and confusion of retreat in 1941 no 
one questioned why prisoners of war had gone unaccounted for in the immediate aftermath of 
Operation Barbarossa.  However, victory at Stalingrad proved to be a blessing and a curse for the 
Soviet Government.  With their affairs being put in order and counteroffensives being planned, 
the Soviet Government could no longer brush off Polish requests for the location of prisoners of 
war.  When retreating Germans found the bodies they took the news to the press immediately 
and accused the Soviet Union of the atrocity.  The Soviet Union countered and claimed the 
Germans had committed the atrocity.   
After the bodies had been located and their existence made public, efforts were made to 
both find out who had committed the murders and turn it into a propaganda tool.  The Polish 
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Government and the Germans issued a request to the International Red Cross (IRC) on the same 
day to investigate the Katyn Massacre in April of 1943.145  The Polish Government was looking 
for answers, but the Germans saw this as a moment to undermine the Allies.  According to 
author Eugenia Maresch, the German plan was effective.  She stated, “The Soviets interpreted 
this as collusion against them by the Poles and the Germans.” 146 Roosevelt and Churchill had 
been working to defend the Polish Government and protect as much of their territorial claim as 
they could against Stalin.  When the Germans and the Polish Government-in-exile made the 
requests to the IRC on the same day, Stalin did not hesitate to use the opportunity as an example 
of the unwillingness of the Polish Government-in-exile to work with the Soviet Union.147  It is 
important to address what Churchill and Roosevelt knew in the spring and summer of 1943 
before addressing what steps were taken to silence the Polish Government on the issue. 
Roosevelt and Churchill may not have had overwhelming evidence by May of 1943 that 
clearly implicated the Soviet Union as the responsible party for the murder of Polish prisoners of 
war.  However, evidence from Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s letters alone proved the two leaders 
were aware that it was most probable that the Soviet Union was guilty of these executions.  In 
addition to the correspondence among the Big Three, Maresch’s work revealed contemporary 
evidence that showed there was little room for doubt by the end of May 1943 for Roosevelt and 
Churchill to understand Stalin was behind the massacre.  The primary document Maresch used in 
her argument was O’Malley’s letter to Anthony Eden. 
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In this letter O’Malley began by laying out the evidence like an unbiased mediator.  He 
stated, “We do not know for certain who murdered a lot of Polish officers in the forest of Katyn 
in April and May 1940…”148 He admitted that the prisoners of war had been under Soviet control 
when they were scheduled to be transferred to a new location.  It was at that time, March of 
1940, that they disappeared.  According to O’Malley the officers had been corresponding with 
their loved ones until March 1940, and they had not been heard from since.  He wrote, “The 
Germans overran Smolensk in July 1941, and there is no easy way to answer the question why, if 
any of the 10,000 had been alive between the end of May 1940 and July 1941, none of them ever 
succeeded in getting any word through to their families.”149  The evidence began to paint a 
clearer picture of what had happened in 1940.   
O’Malley then connected the evidence and showed it was a reasonable assumption the 
Polish men had died at the hands of their Soviet captors.  O’Malley continued his argument by 
questioning why the Soviet authorities were unable to furnish any answers to the Polish 
Government in regards to the whereabouts of the missing Polish soldiers.  He also argued that 
execution of prisoners of war was not consistent with the Germans.  He admitted they had done 
horrible things, but murder of prisoners who could be used for labor was not typical.  His next 
argument was circumstantial, but if true very alarming.  He wrote, “in conversation with the 
Polish Ambassador, a Russian official who had drunk more than was good for him, once referred 
to the disposal of these officers as ‘a tragic error.’”150  If loose lips sink ships, then these 
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intoxicated lips revealed a dark secret.  With the evidence he gathered in May of 1943, O’Malley 
concluded, “The cumulative effect of this evidence is, as I said earlier, to throw serious doubt on 
Russian disclaimers of responsibility for a massacre.”151  O’Malley’s conclusion read like a 
verdict.152 
The bodies in Katyn were undeniably executed Polish prisoners of war, and the Allies 
were aware of this fact.  The timing of the murders placed the prisoners under Soviet control.  
The Soviet Union’s inability to account for the prisoners was alarming, and their own officer had 
admitted to the “tragic error.”  This was the evidence presented to Anthony Eden who shared the 
information with Winston Churchill.  According to Maresch, “Churchill sent a copy of 
O’Malley’s dispatch to … Roosevelt on 13 August 1943 with a note that the first two pages were 
‘grim’ but it was a well written story; and he asked for its return!”153  They may have been 
unwilling to admit what they knew, but it was obvious that their ally was guilty.  It is important 
to understand why Roosevelt wrote, “I am inclined to think that Churchill will find ways and 
means of getting the Polish Government in London to act with more common sense in the 
future.”154  Understanding why they wanted to hide the Katyn Massacre reveals the change that 
had taken place in the balance of power among the Big Three. 
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 Prior to the revelation of the Katyn Massacre and the Soviet victory at Stalingrad the 
Soviet Union had been completely reliant upon the West.  That began to change as early as 
February and became fully evident in April.  If all things had remained the same in the 
relationship and Stalin was still subservient to Churchill and Roosevelt, there would have been 
no harm in allowing the IRC to investigate the mass graves in Katyn Forest.  Allowing the 
investigation would most likely have meant the Grand Alliance did not appear as united as they 
wanted the public to believe, but preventing the investigation represented, if nothing else, a 
change in the relationship.   Had recent events truly placed the Soviet Union on equal footing 
with Roosevelt and Churchill?  Editors Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech 
Materski conducted their own investigation into the Katyn Massacre.  They concluded that there 
was serious concern at the time that the Soviet Government would be unwilling to work with the 
Polish Government after the war if the Polish Government-in-exile continued to press for an 
investigation and thus the cover-up was necessary for postwar cooperation.  Cienciala et al. 
described the first meeting between Churchill and General Sikorski after the news release of the 
Katyn Massacre.  At the meeting “Churchill said he could believe in Soviet guilt, but warned the 
Poles against raising the issue publicly.”155 This was certainly a hard blow to the Sikorski, who 
believed the British Government was still concerned with defending Polish interests.156  
Ceinciala et al. used the Congressional Committee Investigation of the Katyn Forest 
Massacre, 1951-1952, to show the U.S. Government was also involved in the cover up.  They 
wrote, “Like the British government [sic], the Roosevelt administration also suppressed media 
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coverage of Katyn in 1943-1945 in the interest of Allied unity…”157 They also used testimony 
from members of Roosevelt’s Office of War Information to show that any news that would prove 
detrimental to the alliance was officially prohibited.  According to the argument made by 
Cienciala et al., “[Journalist Julius] Epstein had worked in the Office of War Information … and 
became interested in Katyn at that time, but did not write about it owing to the government’s 
policy of suppressing media discussion of the topic.”158  Roosevelt and Churchill had certainly 
not approved of Stalin’s actions, and they were not implying he would never be held 
accountable.  However, they were placing the unity of the Grand Alliance above the 
investigation of a crime that in peacetime would certainly have been publicized and investigated.  
O’Malley’s letter, read by Churchill and Roosevelt, clearly spelled out the ethical dilemma:   
In handling the publicity side of the Katyn affair, we have been constrained by the 
urgent need for cordial relations with the Soviet Government to appear to appraise 
the evidence with more hesitation and leniency than we should do in forming a 
common sense judgement [sic] on events occurring in normal times or in the 
ordinary course of our private lives; we have been obliged to appear to distort the 
normal and healthy operation of our intellectual and moral judgements [sic]; we 
have been obliged to give undue prominence to the tactlessness or impulsiveness 
of Poles, to restrain the Poles from putting their case clearly before the public, to 
discourage any attempt by the public and the press to probe the ugly story to the 
bottom.  In general we have been obliged to deflect attention from possibilities 
which in the ordinary affairs of life, would cry to high heaven for elucidation and 
to withhold the full measure of solicitude which, in other circumstances, would be 
shown to acquaintances situated as a large number of Poles now are.  We have in 
fact perforce used the good name of England like the murderers used the little 
conifers to cover up a massacre; and, in view of the immense importance of an 
appearance of Allied unity and of the heroic resistance of Russia to Germany, few 
will think that any other course would have been wise or right.159 
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 O’Malley understood what would come of his report.  He was right to believe few would 
condemn the decision to silence coverage of the massacre.  That, however, does not justify their 
actions.  Churchill and even more so Roosevelt thought they could gain Stalin’s support and 
goodwill after the war if they helped him during the war.  This included becoming accessories to 
Stalin’s crime.  They were overconfident in their beliefs.  The balance of power had already 
begun to shift when the Germans presented evidence of Katyn.  They recognized it and feared 
losing Stalin’s support during the war.  It only became more difficult for the Big Three to work 
out their differences from that point on.  Often, it would mean conceding to Stalin to keep his 
support.  It is easy to understand why Roosevelt and Churchill made the decisions they made, but 
they should have taken the higher ground.  Of course, one could argue that condemning the 
Soviet Union for the Katyn Massacre could have had detrimental effects on the unity of the 
Grand Alliance, but it will never be known.  At the time, as O’Malley argued, it was more 
important to the Allies to show unity against the Germans then it was to condemn Stalin’s 
decision to execute prisoners of war.  Forty-nine years later, the Soviet Union would publicly 
admit guilt for the Katyn Massacre, but the damage had already been done.  Roosevelt’s and 
Churchill’s actions in the spring and summer of 1943 encouraged Stalin to see how far he could 
push the alliance in his favor.  
 Stalin fully recognized in the summer of 1943 he was no longer completely reliant upon 
the West, and the relationship made a dramatic shift from dependency to suspicion.  Shortly after 
O’Malley’s letter had been passed onto Roosevelt, Stalin wrote a letter to his Allies that said, 
“To date it has been like this: the U.S.A. and Britain reach agreement between themselves while 
the U.S.S.R. is informed of the agreement between the two Powers as a third party looking 
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passively on.  I must say that this situation cannot be tolerated any longer.”160  Roosevelt and 
Churchill had to find a way to give Stalin what he wanted while maintaining, in their minds, the 
principles of the Atlantic Charter.  In the Atlantic Charter the President had said smaller nations, 
such as Poland, “wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have 
been forcibly deprived of them.”161 He reinforced his belief to the press in the summer and fall as 
well.162  However, at the Quebec Conference, in August of 1943, Anthony Eden and Cordell 
Hull discussed the inevitability that the Soviet Union would not concede its claim to part of 
Poland.  Despite the promises made in the Atlantic Charter in 1941, 1943 presented new 
challenges. Secretary Eden admitted that until the Soviet Union made headway on the Polish 
border issue they would be difficult to work with, but he also admitted that it would be 
“difficult…for this or any Polish Government…to accept any surrender of former Polish 
territory.”163  In order to ensure postwar Soviet involvement Eden and Hull did entertain the 
notion of partitioning part of Poland to the Soviet Union leaving most of Poland intact.  They 
were under the impression that denying Stalin this concession would make it harder to save any 
of Poland if it were occupied by the Soviet Union when the Red Army pressed west.164 
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Tehran	
	
The time had finally come for the Big Three to meet face to face!  The Times first 
reported on the meeting in Tehran on December 4, 1943, three days after the conference had 
ended.  In a brief article the author emphasized the importance of the alliance and the necessity 
that the three heads had to meet in person by stating, “But nothing can take the place of the rapid 
exchange of views around a table.  It is there that strategy is knitted together and extended; and 
in no other way can political partnership be developed beyond simple agreement into a sturdy, 
living growth.”165  The press publicly praised the meeting.  
Early reports from London were very interesting too, because neither paper had any 
information to report from the conference at Tehran.  In previous meetings between Churchill 
and Roosevelt there had been much fanfare after the meetings because officials at the 
conferences had published communiqués on what had transpired for the press. The first meeting 
of the Big Three was recognized as significant merely because the three had met together.  There 
seemed to be little concern, in the media, that no communiqués were issued.  There were two 
likely reasons for the relative silence; one, any war plans would have been classified to prevent 
the enemy from gaining any advantage; and two, the political sensitivity of any agreement would 
have ramifications in the three nations at hand, not to mention any nation affected by the 
agreements. 
A search of the Parliamentary Debates provided evidence that it was the British Ministry 
of Information’s intent to keep the conversations and agreements at Tehran a secret.  During a 
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Parliamentary meeting on December 8, 1943, Tom Driberg, a journalist by trade and Member of 
Parliament, asked if he could address complaints “against the mishandling of the public relations 
and Press facilities for the North Africa and Teheran conferences; and whether he can make a 
statement?”166  To which Brendan Bracken, Minister of Information, told Driberg that he could 
respond and inform them “that conferences of this sort cannot be at one and the same time major 
security concerns and the subject of world news.”167 A random tidbit of information that is at the 
very least interesting, if not relevant, according to historian Philip Michael Hett Bell, is that 
Stalin feared flying.  The first time he ever flew was to get to the Tehran Conference, and the last 
time he flew was to return to Moscow.168 
The Cairo Conferences and the Tehran Conference revealed significant information 
regarding the dynamics of the relationship of the Big Three.  The first Cairo Conference was 
held from November 22, to November 26; the Tehran Conference was held from November 28 
to December 1; and the second Cairo Conference was held from December 4, to December 6, 
1943.  Stalin, preoccupied with driving the Nazis from his territory was unable to attend the 
Cairo Conferences, but was able to attend Tehran.  Stalin’s delay gave Churchill and Roosevelt a 
chance to meet with one another and plan their wartime strategy, as well as ensure they were in 
accord on their plans before meeting Stalin.  
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According to First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union Charles E. Bohlen, 
discussions between the British Prime Minister and Soviet Premier bordered on hostile at times.  
Bohlen recorded a conversation in which Stalin alluded to the difference between his relationship 
with Roosevelt and his relationship with Churchill: “At the dinner in the British Legation, Stalin 
referred to both the President and Churchill as his ‘fighting friends’ or ‘comrades-in-arms’, but 
in the case of Churchill he added the observation, ‘if it is possible for me to consider Mr. 
Churchill my friend.’”169  The two certainly struggled to work cordially together due to stubborn 
type-A personalities and ideological preferences: 
Later on in the discussion, in reply to the Prime Minister’s statement that he must 
admit that after the last war he had done everything in his power to prevent the 
spread of Bolshevism in Europe and the setting up of Communist regimes, 
Marshal Stalin said ironically that Mr. Churchill need not have worried quite so 
much, as they (the Russians) had discovered that it was not so easy to set up 
Communist regimes.170  
 
The shifting struggle for power and dominance in the international community was noted 
by Bell as well.  He contended this shift was recognized at Tehran.  “The Soviet Union had 
established its military predominance on the Eastern Front, while the United States was 
outstripping Britain not only in economic power but also in military capacity.”171  Bell went as 
far as to conclude that Roosevelt began to believe the Soviet Union was more important to the 
U.S. for the present and the future than the United Kingdom was.  This argument, however, lacks 
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the evidence necessary to marginalize the British-American relationship, which was reinforced at 
the Second Cairo Conference. 
It is true that Stalin and Roosevelt had a much better relationship at Tehran than 
Churchill and Stalin had, which was exemplified during the dinner meeting mentioned above; 
this contributed to Churchill’s decision often to defer to Roosevelt’s plans in the future in order 
to ensure the longevity of the Anglo-American relationship.  The social interactions and hidden 
meanings found within conversations were critical to the Allied relationship.  Equally important 
were the direct conversations regarding war planning.  During the Tehran conference there were 
several topics discussed but two appeared more than any others, the stubborn issues of borders 
and a second front.   
Since the first conversation had been initiated between Stalin and his Western Allies, the 
issue of a second front had been his primary concern.  In his first meeting at Tehran he did not 
miss the opportunity to keep this point at the forefront of his conversation.  In a meeting recorded 
within the Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes on November 28, 1943, the first day of the 
conference, the Prime Minister explained to Stalin that there would be no second front in 1943 
but that the allies were “resolved to do so in 1944.”172  He added “It would take a long statement 
to explain why the U.S. and U.K. have not been able to strike against France in 1943.”173  
Surprisingly this did not seem to frustrate Stalin, at least as far as the official record was 
concerned.  It is impossible to know if his temperature rose, or he squeezed the arm of his chair 
in frustration.  Outwardly, however, Stalin remained calm and asked what else could be done to 
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help draw troops away from the Soviet border without prolonging the time it took to build up 
troops for the second front?  From that point on, the second front was referred to as Operation 
Overlord, or the landing in the North or Northwest of France.  By the conclusion of the 
conference the powers had all agreed when Operation Overlord would commence. The “Military 
Conclusion of the Tehran Conference,” signed by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, stated;  
Operation Overlord would be launched May 1944, in conjunction with an 
operation against Southern France…the Soviet forces would launch an offensive 
at about the same time with the object of preventing the German forces from 
transferring from the Eastern to the Western Front.174 
 
During a meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin at Tehran, accompanied only by W. 
Averell Harriman (U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union), Charles E. Bohlen (Roosevelt’s 
interpreter), Molotov and V. M. Pavlov (Stalin’s interpreter), Roosevelt revealed his opinion 
about the Polish border at the end of the war as well as what was driving his public position at 
that time.  Historians have argued that Roosevelt gave the Soviet Premier his blessing to annex 
part of Poland during the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, which my evidence disputes.175  
However, at Tehran Roosevelt waded into the murky confluence of domestic politics, 
international relations, and cultural anthropology and attempted to find a solution that would 
please Stalin on the Polish border issue.  According to the notes taken by Bohlen, Roosevelt had 
become willing to concede the fate of several culturally distinct populations to the Soviet Union 
in contradiction with the Atlantic Charter he had signed in 1941.  The questions that must be 
addressed are: what had changed since Roosevelt’s proclamation that all nations that existed 
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before the war remain self-governing after the war, and what did Roosevelt hope to gain by 
changing his position? 
During the private meeting between Roosevelt, Stalin, and their top men, Roosevelt 
recognized that the Red Army, though still driving the Germans from historic Russian territory, 
would quickly occupy Eastern Europe in the race for Berlin.  He even went so far, according to 
Bohlen, as to joke about the situation.  At that moment Roosevelt must have decided future peace 
that was worldwide and maintained by a small group of powerful nations was more important 
than the desires of a few of the smaller states/cultures.  The President did not completely 
abandon the hope that nations currently under German occupation would regain their 
sovereignty.  He stated, that “insofar as public opinion went, would be the question of 
referendum and the right of self-determination.”176  In an apparent move to satisfy Stalin, 
however, Roosevelt immediately backtracked and told Stalin he was “confident that the people 
would vote to join the Soviet Union.”177  These comments significantly contradict the President’s 
public position toward Poland.  What motivated the president to publicly claim self-
determination and confidentially undermine it at the same time?  The answer to that question was 
made blatantly apparent at the beginning of Roosevelt’s conversation with Stalin.   
When Stalin and Roosevelt met at Tehran, the U.S. elections of 1944 were less than a 
year away.  The President told Stalin “there were in the United States from six to seven million 
Americans of Polish extraction…he did not want to lose their vote.”178  The President then went 
on to tell the leader of the Soviet Union that he was willing to concede more than Stalin had 
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asked for in terms of the eastern border of Poland and the Baltic states as well, but he could not 
do so until after the election.  Without further analyzing, it would be easy to claim Roosevelt had 
sold out the Polish people at Tehran and intentionally kept his actions a private matter to ensure 
his fourth term as president.  However, over a year and a half would pass before the end of the 
war and nothing had been put down in writing.  For the time being Roosevelt had gained Stalin’s 
support for a postwar governing body, which Stalin had been hesitant to agree to in the past, and 
more importantly, gained Stalin’s confidence that the two of them were allies in the fight against 
Germany.   
An important question that appears to remain unanswered is why did the President bring 
this up in a meeting with Stalin without Churchill present?  Records show that Churchill was less 
concerned with Poland than the President, despite the fact that the Polish Government-in-exile 
was located in his country.  There seems to be no clear answer to this question.  The most 
rational explanation was the tension between Churchill and Stalin did not facilitate an 
atmosphere in which the President could discuss such matters without being driven to put them 
in writing.  By speaking privately with Stalin, Roosevelt was able to assuage Stalin with open-
ended promises.  This was something Stalin was unwilling to accept from Churchill.  Whether or 
not Churchill’s absence was planned, at Tehran Stalin and Roosevelt developed a more cordial 
relationship than did Stalin and Churchill.  After the conference Churchill’s decision to support 
the U.S. position on cross-channel operations must have been a direct result of the antagonism 
between Churchill and Stalin, especially compared to the more congenial interactions that 
marked the relationship between Stalin and Roosevelt.  What happened that caused Churchill to 
feel his position was in jeopardy if he did not regain Roosevelt’s confidence?   
  84 
Later there was no mention of Roosevelt and Stalin’s meeting as the three leaders 
conversed.  Churchill ran the early part of the discussion informing Stalin that Great Britain had 
gone to war to defend Poland and felt obligated to support her.  He said he would present Soviet 
recommendations to the Polish Government-in-exile, but if they were unwilling to work with the 
U.S.S.R., he would agree to anything the Soviets presented that was within reason.  At that point 
the three men sat around a table and began redrawing international borders with a colored 
pencil.179  This image makes the decisions the Big Three were making seem almost trivial; 
however, as trivial as their decision-making process may have been, the results affected the lives 
of millions, and can still be felt today.  
Despite uncomfortable moments between the Premier and the Prime Minister, Stalin left 
Tehran satisfied with the outcome.  Tehran had given him the opportunity to meet with 
Roosevelt for the first time, as well as to defend his positions in terms of how the future of the 
war should be fought and to make sure a second front was coming.  The meetings also provided 
a sense of unity with the other leaders that he had been lacking, as noted in his letter to Churchill 
and Roosevelt where he complained of all decisions being made with the Soviet Union as an 
after thought.  Matloff summed the Tehran Conference up comprehensively: 
At the conclusion of the Tehran conference the Allied coalition appeared to have 
reached the high-water mark in international collaboration.  Not only had key 
decisions been reached to bring about the speedy defeat of Germany but also, on 
the political level, discussions had been held, generally on an amicable basis, that 
seemed to promise much for the eventual peaceful solution of the problems of the 
postwar era.180 
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 As the year progressed events were unfolding that would further challenge the Grand 
Alliance.  For the time being, however, the three nations were able to enjoy a sense of 
satisfaction, all things being considered, for the war was beginning to turn, and it appeared the 
future might be distinguished by mutual respect which is often formed by uncommon groupings 
of people when they are forced to overcome great odds with one another.  According to Bellamy 
“Tehran was in some ways the high point of the Grand Alliance.”181  The Allies had gained 
Stalin’s trust and support for their war plans, despite postponing Operation Overlord.  Bellamy 
concluded that Stalin did not walk away from Tehran empty handed.  For his support, “The 
Soviet Union would be free to occupy whatever the Red Army conquered.  Henceforward, 
‘Allied’ agreement would focus on the division of spoils, rather than on saving Russia.”182  
Bellamy was to some degree correct in his assessment that Tehran marked the high point of the 
relationship, but only in terms of cordial negotiations and wartime strategies required to defeat 
the Nazis.  Unfortunately for the West, at Tehran Stalin was able to use his recent victories over 
the German forces as leverage in his negotiations.  Roosevelt and Churchill had to begin 
compromising with Stalin to ensure he worked with them in the future.  For the millions of East 
Europeans that had been handed over to the Soviet Union, Tehran marked an ultimate low. 
Less than three hours after Roosevelt met with Stalin, they reconvened with Churchill for 
a final meeting.  During this meeting Roosevelt wanted to address two topics, the partition of 
Germany and the Polish border.  The discussion over German partitioning was short.  All agreed 
that it should be broken up but there was no consensus as to how it should be broken up.  This 
topic would become paramount to future relations between the East and the West with the Berlin 
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Wall representing the center of the Cold War, but at the time it was agreed only that something 
should be done.  Instead the topic turned again to Poland. 
The benefits of Anglo-American consensus prior to meeting Stalin are obvious, but 
Churchill and Roosevelt took their unanimity to the next level at the second meeting at Cairo in 
which they were able to readdress their initial plans.  Helmuth von Moltke’s commonly 
paraphrased saying claimed “no plan survives first contact with the enemy.”  In the same vein 
Churchill and Roosevelt were able to regroup and plan a new attack at the Second Cairo 
Conference after their first joint contact with Stalin.  Stalin had wedged himself between 
Roosevelt and Churchill.  Churchill recognized the gap between him and his closest ally and took 
immediate steps to unite the two again.  The same day Stalin left Tehran for Moscow, Churchill 
and Roosevelt had dinner.  The Editorial Note from a summary comprised by Admiral William 
D. Leahy in the Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers on the Second Cairo 
Conference articulated this point very well: 
During the dinner Roosevelt and Churchill compared their reactions to Stalin and 
reviewed the military and political discussion with our Russian ally that had just 
ended.  The Prime Minister clearly indicated that he was inclined toward the 
American Point of view on matters that up to then had produced much 
controversy between the U.S. and British staffs, particularly on the timing of the 
cross-Channel attack on Germany.183   
 
Churchill’s comments, as recorded by Leahy, show he recognized how the meeting had 
changed the dynamics of the Grand Alliance and he was ready to defer to the Americans 
whenever necessary to prevent Stalin from wedging a larger gap between himself and Roosevelt.  
As the leaders of the coalition against Hitler and his allies met, the Soviet Union was continuing 
to take back the ground they had lost in 1941; the Americans and British had made great strides 
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in the Mediterranean, including the surrender of Italy, and they were beginning to see the tide 
turn in the Pacific.  When the leaders of the Big Three returned to their respective nations, their 
correspondence for the remainder of the calendar year was minimal and mostly focused on 
congratulations, well wishes for birthdays – Stalin’s birthday was in December – and recognition 
that they needed to meet again as often as possible.  As the New Year kicked off and the 
Yuletide spirit passed, the letters amongst the three began to pick up.  This was particularly true 
for Roosevelt and Churchill. 
 In January 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill began discussing what they needed to alter in 
order to make sure Overlord happened as scheduled.  This included ship movements, changes in 
allotments of supplies, and a determination of whether they could fulfill their promise to hand the 
Italian fleet over to Stalin before Overlord.  During their communications, they displayed 
overwhelming concern that they would compromise their trust with Stalin if they began 
amending the commitments they had made at Tehran.  Roosevelt shared his concern by writing, 
“I think you will agree that we must not go back on what we told U.J. (Uncle Joe, Roosevelt’s 
nickname for Stalin).”184  The leaders also recognized that future partnership with the Soviet 
Union would only be maintained if the West were able to do all they could to keep their word.  
Who could blame the Soviet Union for walking away from its promises if the West did not keep 
theirs?  To that degree, the Soviet Union had gained the upper hand as the more potentially 
aggrieved partner in the three-way relationship and Tehran represented the pinnacle of the 
relations in terms of war planning and postwar planning.  Yet, at the same time it was the 
moment where the West had to pay a heavy price for not calling Stalin to account for what 
happened at Katyn. 
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Between Tehran and Yalta significant events transpired among the Big Three.  The time 
period between the first and last meeting of the original members of the Grand Alliance was a 
little more than a year.  In that time the second front was opened, Paris was liberated, and the 
Germans lost what proved to be their final offensive.  The war was not over, but the beginning of 
the year was smooth among the three because of the cordial relationship that developed between 
Churchill and Stalin.  However, the relationship among the three quickly declined.  As great as 
their hope may have been for the future, the Cold War’s prospect was visible in the 
correspondence among the “friends” in 1944.  The relationship began to chill due to Stalin’s 
suspicious nature and his expectations that the West keep their word.  In addition, Churchill and 
Roosevelt were vacillating on their position toward the Polish border. The Soviets viewed 
Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s noncommittal stance on Poland to be intentional, planned deception. 
 On the first of February, 1944, less than two months after the Tehran conference, Stalin 
received a letter from Churchill in which the British Prime Minister informed the Soviet Premier 
that the Polish Government-in-exile was unwilling to accept the Polish-Soviet boundary as 
agreed upon at Tehran.  Churchill also informed Stalin that His Majesty’s Government intended 
to support the exiled government, which he had previously said was not an issue upon which the 
United Kingdom would take a stand.185 Historian Halik Kochanski clearly described Polish 
reliance upon Britain in 1944 by stating, “With relations severed between Poland and the Soviet 
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Union, [Polish Prime Minister Stanislaw] Mikolajczyk’s government was entirely dependent on 
the goodwill of Britain and the United States to act as intermediaries.”186 This, of course, was not 
taken well in the Soviet Union.  Whatever Stalin’s faults may have been and whatever 
inadequacies he may have had as a leader, he was not forgetful.   
Three days later Stalin responded to Churchill, although Churchill did not receive his 
response until the end of March.  Stalin abrasively reminded him that both he and Roosevelt had 
committed to the Curzon line at Tehran.  He stated, “I have no doubt that if you had continued to 
stand firmly, as before, by the attitude you adopted at Teheran, the dispute with the Polish 
Émigré Government would already have been settled.”187  He then went to rub the point into the 
wound he had intended by stating, “As for myself and the Soviet Government, we continue to 
stand by the attitude we adopted at Teheran and have no intention of departing from it.”188  Stalin 
said this  “method of threats and discreditation [sic], if it will be used in the future as well, will 
not favor this cooperation.”189    Both Stalin and Churchill sent a copy of this letter to Roosevelt, 
hoping that Roosevelt would take their side.  However, Roosevelt recognized his relationship 
with both sides was in the balance, and being the expert politician he was, simply said that they 
must all do their best to work out an equitable solution.190  Was Stalin’s frustration justified? 
Stalin as a persona of history has been overwhelmingly portrayed as one of the most 
illustrious villains of all time.  Of course, there is little to be said for him that could counter that 
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argument, but in the early months of 1944 he certainly was no better or worse than his allies.  
Roosevelt and Churchill were willing to compromise their principles, at least in their 
correspondence, to appease Stalin.  The question remains, were they speaking the truth when 
they made their promises or were they were they deceiving Stalin from the start?  Stalin was not 
above deception, but he was willing to call others out if he felt he had been deceived.  It was at 
this point Stalin put his foot down.  Perhaps he felt it was his obligation to abide by the directive 
he had given his men in 1942: Order No. 227 – not one step back.191  
 During the same time period the Soviet position on Poland was being publicized through 
the press.  In February the Associated Press in London produced an article from Soviet news that 
was published in the New York Times stressing that the Soviet Union desired normal relations 
with Poland, but it would not work with the government-in-exile.192  Journalist Joseph Levy took 
the argument to the next step.  Writing from Ankara, Turkey, he claimed the Turkish belief was, 
“Russia will never agree to the reestablishment of Poland within the 1921 boundaries.”193    
Levy’s reference to 1921 related to the border created after the Polish-Soviet War that ended in 
1921. As a result of that war, the Soviet Union had been forced to cede territory beyond what had 
been lost when the Curzon Line was established as their western frontier.  These articles show 
there was public knowledge that Stalin wanted Polish territory after the war, but there was still 
hope that the other members of the Allies would fight for Poland’s autonomy and territorial 
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protection along the same lines as the prewar boundaries.194  The activity of the press, however, 
did not act as a catalyst among the Big Three; in fact their correspondence began to wane as the 
summer began. 
 After meeting at Tehran, the Big Three quickly realized their missives did not convey the 
same meaning as face-to-face conversations did, much like The Times had predicted in 1943.195  
The messages from Stalin to Roosevelt in particular seem to have slowed.  For the most part, 
their letters discussed the movement of ships from one theater to another in order to support 
Operation Overlord.  There was little discussion of anything other than victories and ships in the 
build up to D-Day.  Then June 6th came, and D-Day went, and little more was said than a brief 
congratulations.  The sad irony cannot be ignored that the most pivotal topic upon which the 
alliance had originally hinged received no more mention in their personal notes than the passing 
of a birthday.  Stalin had told Molotov to reach an agreement on a second front even if it meant 
conceding to all other demands in 1942, but that was before Stalingrad, before the Katyn 
Massacre site had been found, before Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to give up Poland to 
achieve their goals.  Poland had become the single most important point of contention.  
Volkogonov argued Stalin had returned to the Polish issue, even though it had been left out of 
the Anglo-Soviet Treaty.  He wrote, “The Polish question was not only one of honour [sic], but 
was also one of security.”196  In Stalin’s mind the second front had become secondary.  The 
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landing at Normandy that led to the second front was a significant moment in the war and has 
been celebrated ever since, but the men who made it happen were forward thinkers.  They had a 
war to win and a future world to plan.   
 The future became more political and imminent than theoretical.  Once the troops had 
secured the beaches of Normandy, there was little doubt that victory would be achieved over 
Hitler.   Roosevelt and Churchill recognized they needed to begin resolving the Polish issue as 
soon as practicable.  Attempting to resolve the issue, Roosevelt met with Polish Prime Minister 
Mikolajczyk in June of 1944, and sent a letter to Stalin to describe his thoughts.  In his letter, 
Roosevelt described how important Poland was in the fight against Germany and that 
Mikolajczyk would be willing to work with the Soviet Government.197   
Roosevelt’s attempt to promote a positive Polish-Soviet relationship, however, was 
sandwiched between statements that claimed he would not intervene between the Polish 
Government-in-exile and the Soviet Union.   At the beginning of a letter to Stalin Roosevelt 
stated, “His [Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk’s] visit was not connected with any attempt 
on my part to inject…between the Polish Government-in-exile and the Soviet Government.”198  
He concluded by stating, “I am in no way attempting to press upon you my personal views in a 
matter which is of special concern to you and your country.”199  Roosevelt’s comments were not 
even passive-aggressive.  He was being incredibly passive.  If he wanted to see a strong Poland 
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in existence after the war he needed to take a stronger position with Stalin.  A week later Stalin 
responded and agreed to work with Mikolajczyk, given that Mikolajczyk agreed to Stalin’s idea 
of where the border was to fall.200  Stalin was determined to uphold his self-appointed name – 
man of steel – and the Allies would have to find out what his Achilles heel was if they wanted to 
weaken his position.  
In the meantime, the relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt was coming under 
greater stress.  In the aftermath of Overlord, Eisenhower decided it was more important to press 
on through France than it was to focus efforts on the Mediterranean.  Churchill wrote a dramatic 
plea to Roosevelt asking that he weigh in on the issue and stick to the plan they had decided 
upon at Tehran.  He finished by penning a desperate conclusion: “It is with the greatest sorrow 
that I write to you in this sense…I send you every good wish…my personal gratitude to you for 
your kindness to me and for all you have done for the cause of freedom that will never be 
diminished.”201  Roosevelt responded the same day and said plainly that he was going to support 
his Chiefs of Staff and allow them to reinforce France rather than moving more troops into 
position into the Mediterranean.  He concluded by stating “I always think of my early geometry: 
‘A straight line is the shortest distance between two points.’”202  Considering their history, 
Roosevelt’s decision must have seemed like a kick in the head to Churchill.  After all, Churchill 
surely felt victorious when the D-Day landing was successfully accomplished after having 
prevented Roosevelt from inviting a possible massacre two years earlier. 
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Despite the frustration Churchill must have felt, he picked up his pen and conceded to his 
younger partner the plans for attack across Europe.  There was still a bigger battle to win, he 
could not lose his closest ally, and over the next month events continued to unfold in favor of 
Stalin’s position in the east.  On July 20, 1944, Churchill wrote a letter to Stalin covering details 
about military awards, convoys, admiration for Soviet victories, and a plea that Stalin work with 
Mikolajczyk.  In his wording Churchill was very passive.  He wrote: 
With respect to Poland I have avoided saying anything because I trust in you to 
make comradeship with the underground movement if it really strikes hard and 
true against the Germans.  Should Mikolajczyk ask to come to see you, I hope you 
will consent.203 
 
 Stalin’s response revealed he knew he had taken the hill, in terms of strategic 
positioning for postwar plans, and he did not plan to budge until he had all he desired.  
He started with “Events on our front are going forward at a very rapid pace.  Lubin, one 
of Poland’s major towns, was taken today by our troops, who continue their advance.”204  
Stalin went on to say the Soviet Government had no desire to set up its own government 
in Poland, and that he supported a democratic Polish government, but he did not believe 
there was any group assembled at the time capable of governing Poland.  In other words, 
until there was a favorable government that the Soviet Union approved of Stalin would 
not accept an alternative.205  Volkogonov believed this was true of Stalin as well and 
wrote, “Stalin made it plain that he was more concerned about governments than 
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borders.”206  Mikolajczyk visited Moscow, but it was to no avail.  He and Stalin could not 
come to an understanding.  As the summer of 1944 neared an end Warsaw was under 
attack and the Soviet Premier began to divert troops and munitions from that fight.   
 Stalin’s actions against Warsaw were so drastic that Roosevelt and Churchill 
immediately sent a letter to the Premiere requesting that he support Warsaw.207  Stalin 
composed a response that put the blame on the residents for the Warsaw Uprising.  He 
argued, “Sooner or later the truth about the handful of power-seeking criminals who 
launched the Warsaw adventure will come out.”208  Stalin had no qualms over redirecting 
blame to promote his plans.  In this case, Stalin went so far as to free the Germans of 
blame of the fight in Warsaw.  He concluded by stating the Red Army itself would 
liberate Warsaw, which also indicated that he would not provide the Polish residents any 
of the requirements they had requested to continue the fight themselves.  Stalin was 
unwilling to jeopardize his grasp over Poland.  Even as he was vowing to protect the 
Polish people, he was unwilling to give them the ability to strike back at the Soviet Union 
in the future as they had during the Russian Civil War, or as they had throughout 
history.209  Furthermore, Roosevelt and Churchill had shown they were not willing to 
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stand up for Poland when Stalin pushed back in April of 1943, why should Stalin have 
concerned himself with their position toward Warsaw? 
 The rest of the summer was conflict-free for the Big Three, but as the ground 
around Moscow began to harden, so did Stalin’s position toward Poland.  Prime Minister 
Mikolajczyk continued to meet with Churchill, and whether from a sense of honor, 
justice, or political security, Churchill continued to implore Stalin to work amicably with 
Mikolojczyk.210  Stalin made it clear in early December that he was unwilling to do so, 
and put the blame on the Polish Prime Minister in Exile.  He wrote to Churchill, “It has 
become obvious since my last meeting with Mr [sic] Mikolajczyk in Moscow that he is 
incapable of helping a Polish settlement.  Indeed, his negative role has been revealed.”211 
Stalin then went on to argue that those associated with Mikolajczyk had ‘treacherous 
designs.’  Perhaps this accusation was completely unfounded, like Stalin’s accusation that 
the Germans were responsible for the Katyn Massacre.  Stalin was willing to distort the 
truth to any degree required to ensure his ambitions were accomplished.  In this case his 
accusations went unchallenged, and the next message from Stalin that related to Poland 
discussed the formation of the Provisional National Government of the Polish Republic, 
which had been approved by the Soviet powers overseeing Poland during the war.212   
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 Stalin’s actions in Poland brought Roosevelt great consternation.213  He had been 
attempting to appease Stalin as often as he could to ensure the international community 
was protected by an international organization after the war.  Roosevelt believed that was 
the only way to ensure peace.  When he found out that Stalin had recognized a 
government other than the one in exile, he was flabbergasted and immediately sent his 
concerns to Stalin and a copy of the message to Churchill.  In the letter Roosevelt argued 
there had been an agreement to make sure the Polish people decided their own fate, and 
that only part of Poland had been freed form Hitler’s grasp.  Thus, any decision made by 
those who were free was not representative of the whole of Poland.  He finished his letter 
by urging Stalin not to delay meeting in person.214  At Tehran Roosevelt believed he had 
persuaded Stalin to work equitably, but Stalin’s recognition of a Polish Government other 
than the one in exile proved he was pursuing his own interests and Roosevelt’s efforts, to 
a degree, had been futile. 
 Since the conclusion of Yalta, in February of 1944, those who documented contemporary 
events and the historians who followed have argued that Yalta was the place and time that the 
West abandoned Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe, and that from that point Cold War 
problems began to emerge.  The redrawing of Polish boundaries and the existence of a joint 
agreement between outside nations on who would make up the Polish Government in the 
aftermath of Yalta came as a great surprise to the Polish-Americans who had just reelected 
Roosevelt to his fourth term in office.  Their concerns were presented in an article in the New 
                                                
213 In a letter to Editor Morgan Hoyt of the Beacon Roosevelt mentioned his attitude toward 
dealing with Stalin.  See Franklin D. Roosevelt, F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945. Edited 
by Elliott Roosevelt. Vol. 2 (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1950) 1572. 
 
214 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Doc 494” December 30, 1944, in Roosevelt and Churchill, 640-641. 
 
  98 
York Times.  According to the New York Times, “John A. Giminski, president of the Pulaski 
Republican League of New York State, said...[Roosevelt] ‘with his usual artful dodging’ had 
failed to ‘satisfy any of the demands’ made to him by a group of Polish Americans.”215 The 
public was unaware that the decision to divide Poland had been conceded at Tehran.   
At that time, however, Roosevelt was concerned with the election.  By the time the press 
announced what had transpired at Yalta, Roosevelt’s health was declining, and he surely had no 
intentions on running for a fifth term in 1948.  Therefore, Roosevelt was less concerned with 
public opinion and allowed a more thorough release than he had after Tehran.  There was also 
backlash in the United Kingdom.  An article published in The Times of London two weeks after 
the conclusion of Yalta recognized not only American frustrations, but also those of several 
Roman Catholics over the agreement in regards to Poland, placing blame on Churchill and 
Roosevelt.  According to the Times: 
The Roman Catholic Archbishops and Bishops of Scotland [had] issued a 
statement condemning the Yalta decisions on Poland which they describe[d] as a 
‘blow between the eyes’ to the people of an empire which voluntarily went to war 
to honour [sic] its pledge to defend Poland against aggression.216 
 
The misconceptions in the aftermath of Yalta have led historians to believe Yalta was 
pivotal in deciding the fate of millions of East Europeans.  Historians such as Serhii Plokhy have 
argued, “Every major geopolitical sticking point…and the legitimacy of territorial acquisitions – 
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came together in the debate on Poland.”217  However, in the same year Plokhy’s book was 
published, 2010, historian Fraser J. Harbutt published a book that more accurately countered 
traditional opinions. Harbutt argued that the accepted historiography of the World War II alliance 
and how it led to the Cold War was based on inaccurate assumptions that Roosevelt and 
Churchill pitted the East against the West, and Yalta was when the Allies divided Europe and 
created the problems that led to the Cold War.218  Harbutt’s position was that Roosevelt’s actions 
at Yalta led rather to the emergence of American hegemony over Europe and gave Stalin 
permission to dominate East Europe and most of Asia.219  Once the most critical moments have 
been addressed, it is clear Harbutt’s argument more closely followed the path of truth.  However, 
one point Harbutt did not linger on was that Roosevelt sidestepped Churchill completely when it 
came to planning for postwar Asia.220    
During the first day of the conference Roosevelt decided to meet with Stalin 
alone.  Perhaps, he was still attempting to assuage Stalin during the war to make postwar 
relations friendlier, reinforcing his idea of the Four Horsemen, and promoting the United 
Nations as the protector of an unending international peace.  Whatever his goal was, he 
was going to pursue it whole-heartedly even if that meant threatening the ailing 
relationship he had with Churchill.  Bohlen recorded the private message between 
Roosevelt and Stalin: 
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The President said he would like to tell the Marshal something indiscreet, since he 
would not wish to say it in front of Prime Minister Churchill, namely that the 
British for two years have had the idea of artificially building up France into a 
strong power which would have 200,000 troops on the eastern border of France to 
hold the line for the period required to assemble a strong British army.  He said 
the British were a peculiar people and wished to have their cake and eat it too.221 
 
 The President then went on to discuss the partition of Germany, an opinion that fell in 
line with what Stalin and Churchill desired, but admitted he had hoped the U.S. could have 
occupied the Northwest.  According to the record, Stalin made no comment about the British 
plans.   Roosevelt and Stalin met again on February 8, without Churchill, for a meeting that 
focused on the Far East.  In this meeting they discussed a joint trusteeship of Korea, which 
would also include China, and Roosevelt believed the British should not have a part in the 
stewardship.  Stalin was willing to accept the plan, but both agreed the British would be upset to 
have no part in running Korea.222   
 Why was Roosevelt willing to cut Churchill out of the East and inform Stalin of their 
intent to use the French as a buffer between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union until 
British forces had returned to full strength?  There were three reasons.  First, Roosevelt wanted 
to make sure the Red Army would pick up the fight in and around the Pacific as soon as possible 
after Germany surrendered.  Second, the U.S. Government had been concerned about British 
intentions from the beginning of their involvement in the war.223  Finally, Roosevelt desired to 
prevent any hegemony, especially British hegemony, of international power that could lead to 
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another war.  The British Government had traditionally dominated the international scene and 
His Majesty’s Government had done little to prevent the Second World War, some even argued 
they allowed it to happen.  Therefore, Roosevelt took it upon himself to work with the Soviet 
Union, which prior to Roosevelt’s presidency had not even been officially recognized by the 
U.S., to protect the future.   
 While the Yalta Conference produced a successful agreement between Stalin and 
Roosevelt for the Red Army to fight Japan after victory in Europe, it revealed the growing 
disparity between British and American postwar plans in Europe.  During the conference 
Roosevelt met with Churchill the same number of times he met with Stalin; however, the 
meetings between Roosevelt and Churchill were not recorded, according to Bohlen.  Great 
speculations could be made from the lack of notes during these meetings, but conjecture about 
this situation is not research.  Rather, it is important to recognize that Churchill would not have 
felt slighted during Yalta by the meetings between Roosevelt and Stalin, because he was meeting 
with the President as well and had no idea, supposedly, of what Roosevelt and Stalin had 
discussed.  Whatever Roosevelt and Churchill discussed was not to be shared with anyone 
outside of the meeting.  There was an increasing disparity emerging between what Roosevelt and 
Churchill felt was important after the war.224  Churchill focused on Europe and the 
Mediterranean, the remnants of the British Empire and the areas closest to the British Isles.  
Roosevelt, on the other hand, was increasingly concerned with how Asia was going to fit into the 
new international society he was planning.   
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Roosevelt must have left Yalta with a sense of accomplishment over his interaction with 
Stalin. The agreements they had reached encouraged Roosevelt to feel he and Stalin were more 
than comrades-in-arms.  Unfortunately, Roosevelt’s confidence continually gave Stalin the 
advantage in their discussions.  It would soon become clear that Stalin was not as much of a 
straightforward negotiator as he had imagined.  The Big Three knew that they were close to 
victory, fewer than three months in fact, and over the next month the letters shared between 
Roosevelt and Stalin were very cordial.  This certainly reinforced Roosevelt’s false sense of 
comradeship with Stalin.  Roosevelt even congratulated Stalin on the “twenty-seventh 
anniversary of the founding of the Red Army.”225  He concluded the letter by commenting on his 
expectations for a “world based upon mutual understanding and cooperation.”226  Then reality set 
in.  A month later it must have hit hard when Roosevelt received Stalin’s response to a request 
that American planes be permitted into Soviet air space to help with the search for and return of 
American prisoners of war and soldiers who had been separated from the army.  Specifically, 
they hoped to look for Americans in Polish hospitals.  Stalin wrote: 
 With regard to your information about allegedly large numbers of sick and 
injured Americans in Poland or waiting evacuation to Odessa, or who have not 
contacted the Soviet authorities, I must say that the information is inaccurate.  
Actually, apart from a certain number who are on their way to Odessa, there were 
only 17 U.S. servicemen on Polish soil as of March 16.  I have today received a 
report which says that the 17 men will be flown to Odessa in a few days.227   
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When Roosevelt read Stalin’s reply it must have made his heart sink.  After all he had 
done to conceal the Katyn Massacre, Roosevelt was receiving the same message from Stalin 
about his own men.  This topic shows that as the Red Army continued to make its way to Berlin, 
and Stalin had the Polish issue in writing, along with a planned partition of Germany and a 
generous sphere of influence throughout Eastern Europe, he became more difficult to work with.  
He displayed little regard for Roosevelt’s concerns.  Roosevelt then received more devastating 
news.  The State Department had been informed that Molotov would not be attending the 
Conference on the United Nations; instead the Soviet Union was planning to send another 
representative.  Roosevelt was concerned “Mr [sic] Molotov’s absence will be construed all over 
the world as a lack of comparable interest in the great objectives of this Conference on the part of 
the Soviet Government.”228  Less than two months after Roosevelt confided in Stalin his 
aspirations for the world after the war free of any form of hegemony, Stalin had denied 
Roosevelt’s request for support finding missing and injured Americans, and had started to 
undermine international cooperation before it began.  The alliance that was formed out of 
necessity and sustained through dependency had regressed in practice, not just in morality. 
 The elation experienced at Yalta continued to wear off, and sober reality set in.  Churchill 
and Roosevelt both came to realize that cultivating a relationship with Stalin had come at a great 
cost, and they were not likely to regain their losses.  On the March 27, 1945, Churchill wrote two 
letters to Roosevelt.  In these letters Churchill acknowledged Stalin had quickly become difficult 
to work with considering how agreeable he had been at Yalta.  The primary concern of 
Churchill’s letters was Poland.  He wrote of Stalin, “He persists in his view that the Yalta 
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communiqué merely meant the addition of a few other Poles to the existing administration of 
Russian puppets and that these puppets should be consulted first.”229  The harsh reality that these 
two politicians, perhaps two of the best politicians in the world, had been duped, by the leader of 
a backward society of agricultural communists, must have been extremely painful.  Roosevelt 
believed that he could woo Stalin by opening up to him and agreeing with his many requests. 
Churchill was less willing to cater to Stalin’s personality, but he still believed he could trust 
Stalin to honor their agreements as Churchill saw them.  The greatest problem the Big Three 
faced in their relationship was contradictory goals.  They shared the same strategic goal of 
defeating Hitler.  However, each individual had divergent postwar plans.  None of their postwar 
plans would bear the fruit the leaders of the alliance had envisioned. 
 Churchill admitted in his letters that if he could not save Poland he would have to inform 
the House of Commons.  He wrote,  “There I advised critics of the Yalta settlement to trust 
Stalin.  If I have to make a statement of facts to the House, the whole world will draw the 
deduction that such advice was wrong.”230  Churchill also agreed that it appeared as though 
Stalin was undermining the creation of the United Nations by not intending to send Molotov to 
San Francisco, as Roosevelt had stated earlier.  The content of Churchill’s follow-up letter read 
like a carbon copy of his first of the day.  He and Roosevelt were extremely concerned with 
Stalin’s actions.  The end of the war was near, and the future of the world depended on how 
successful they were negotiating with Stalin.   
 As March concluded, Roosevelt had two weeks left to live.  Certainly his heart was heavy 
as his health was failing.  The American president had brought the United States through the 
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Great Depression and led troops to German soil as World War II neared the end.  However, it 
was unmistakable that he had misjudged Stalin.  A heated exchanged then began between Stalin 
and Roosevelt that had to do with whether or not Anglo-American forces had been accepting the 
surrender of German Armies without Soviet representation.  On April 1, 1945, Roosevelt stated, 
“…It seems to me that, although both of us are in agreement on all the basic principles, the 
matter now stands in an atmosphere of regrettable apprehension and mistrust.”231  Stalin then 
opened his response by stating, “You are quite right in saying…that ‘the matter now stands in an 
atmosphere of regrettable apprehension and mistrust.’”232  Over the next nine days the two 
‘allies’ wrote back and forth discussing their positions in regards to Poland and the ways in 
which each felt he had been deceived by the other.  Their relationship that had been forged in 
necessity, sustained by dependency, and cemented through complicity at Katyn had certainly 
been falling apart and was nearly undone by the middle of April.  Two days before he died, 
Roosevelt sent what would be his final message to Stalin; ironically Stalin received it the day 
Roosevelt passed away.  It stated: 
Thank you for your frank explanation of the Soviet point of view of the Bern 
incident which now appears to have faded into the past without having 
accomplished any useful purpose.  There must not, in any event, be mutual 
mistrust and minor misunderstandings of this character should not arise in the 
future.  I feel sure that when our armies make contact in Germany and join in a 
fully coordinated offensive the Nazi Armies will disintegrate.233 
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The same day Roosevelt penned a letter to Churchill.  He was responding to a question 
Churchill had on how to deal with the House of Commons when he addressed them on the 
Soviet-Polish issue.  Roosevelt’s response to Churchill did not match his letters to Stalin.  It was 
confident and optimistic.  Perhaps Roosevelt, in a moment of hope and levity, believed he could 
still entice Stalin to work cordially with Poland and work jointly on an international organization 
at the conclusion of the war.  His last letter to Churchill read as follows: 
I would minimize the general soviet [sic] problem as much as possible because 
the problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day and most of them 
straighten out as in the case of the Bern meeting.  We must be firm, however, and 
our course thus far is correct.234   
 
 Roosevelt’s death was a blow to the United States, the world, and the Grand Alliance.  
The New York Times published an article that that declared, “A great and gallant wartime leader 
has died almost in the very hour of the victory to which he led the way…It is a hard and stunning 
blow to lose the genius and inspiration of his leadership in this decisive moment of the war.”235  
The correspondence among the Big Three and their actions indicated that the alliance was 
quickly falling apart.  Perhaps Roosevelt had a plan to revive it, or maybe he assumed the 
meeting in San Francisco that would be the birthplace of the United Nations this could convince 
Stalin to work cordially with the West.  Whatever his plans were, they would go unfulfilled.  The 
first man in line to fill in for Roosevelt was Vice President, and former Senator, Harry S Truman, 
who, like Churchill, had been very open prior to the war about his anticommunist sentiment.  It 
was also sad that less than a month would pass before victory in Europe was achieved, and 
Roosevelt was unable to see the partial fruit of his work.  During that time Truman took over and 
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continued the work that needed to be done.  The correspondence that took place primarily 
between Truman and Stalin between the time Truman took over for Roosevelt and Potsdam was 
cordial and focused on the partitioning of Germany, the link-up of troops, and the fate of Poland.  
Interestingly, there was next to no contention within their letters.  However, Volkogonov argued 
Stalin did not trust Truman, but hid his concerns at the time.236   
 Before his death Roosevelt had feared an “atmosphere of regrettable apprehension and 
mistrust” was developing between the West and the Soviet Union.”237  His words accurately 
summed up the relationship between East and West for the next forty-six years.  Between 
Roosevelt’s death and the end of the war in Europe, Churchill sent a message to Stalin requesting 
that he work to overcome their differences because they were, in Churchill’s opinion, more 
significant than Stalin made them out to be.  In fact, part of Churchill’s letter read like a 
precursor to his famous ‘Iron Curtain’ speech of 1946.  He wrote to Stalin:  
There is not much comfort in looking into a future where you and the countries 
you dominate, plus the Communist parties in many other States, [sic] are all 
drawn up on one side, and those who rally to the English-speaking nations and the 
Associates [sic] or Dominions [sic] are on the other.  It is quite obvious that their 
quarrel would tear the world to pieces and that all of us leading men on either side 
who had anything to do with that would be shamed before history…But do not, I 
beg you, my friend Stalin, underrate the divergencies [sic] which are opening 
about matters which you may think are small to us but which are symbolic of the 
way the English-speaking democracies look at life.238 
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Churchill recognized the deterioration of the Grand Alliance was taking place before 
victory and attempted to stop it.  A week later, On May 8, 1945, after many letters discussing 
which day was most appropriate to make a public announcement, the Allies officially declared 
victory in Europe.  Truman stepped into the office just before victory in Europe, but he still had a 
long battle ahead.  Most important, he had to figure out how to work with the men Roosevelt had 
spent years corresponding with and meeting in person.  Six days after V-E Day, Eleanor 
Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt’s widow, addressed a letter to Truman.  She offered words of 
wisdom her husband had shared with her in regards to dealing with Churchill and Stalin.  She 
wrote: 
Your experience with Mr. Churchill is not at all surprising.  He is suspicious of 
the Russians and they know it…Of course, we will have to be patient, and any 
lasting peace will have the Three Great Powers behind it.  I think, however, if you 
can get on a personal basis with Mr. Churchill, you will find it easier.  If you talk 
to him about books and let him quote to you from his marvelous memory…you 
find him easier to deal with on political subjects.  He is a gentleman to whom the 
personal element means a great deal.  Mr. Churchill does not have the same kind 
of sense of humor that the Russians have.  In some ways the Russians are more 
like us.  They enjoy a practical joke, rough-play and they will joke about things 
which Mr. Churchill thinks are sacred.  He takes them dead seriously and argues 
with them when what he ought to do is to laugh.  That was where Franklin usually 
won out because if you know where to laugh and when to look upon things as too 
absurd to take seriously, the other person is ashamed to carry through even if he 
was serious about it.239 
 
Eleanor and Franklin may not have had an ideal marriage, but it is obvious that he 
confided in her and shared his understanding of how best to deal with such opposing 
personalities.  Her words to Truman also revealed how Roosevelt was able to work better with 
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Churchill and Stalin each on an individual basis than Stalin and Churchill were able to work 
together.  Roosevelt believed he knew how to placate each man when they did not see eye to eye 
to achieve his objectives.  However, their correspondence showed Roosevelt and Stalin had 
stopped trusting each other.  Perhaps, had he not passed away, he could have developed a better 
relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union after the war after all.  Believing that 
Roosevelt could have cemented a better relationship with the Soviet Union, however, is a far 
stretch.  Most likely, once Stalin had achieved his primary goals he would have continued to 
antagonize the West regardless of who the President was. 
Roosevelt’s passing was a tremendous loss, but the Allies had to continue planning for 
victory.  The next meeting of the heads of the three primary powers that had united to defeat 
Germany and Japan was scheduled for July.  A month later the two atomic bombs were dropped 
on Japan and on September 2, 1945 – six years and one day after Hitler invaded Poland – the 
Japanese officially surrendered, and the war was over.  Potsdam, like Yalta, has been used as an 
example of failed diplomacy between East and West that led to the Cold War.  Historian Michael 
Neiberg argued otherwise.  He saw those events as successes and blamed the deterioration of 
relations between the Soviet Union on the use of the atom bomb and Stalin’s belief the U.S. 
intended to use that bomb against the Soviet Union.240 Whether Potsdam was a success or a 
failure, the damage had been done before the war was over. 
When Stalin and Churchill met with Truman at Potsdam they were already one member 
short of the original alliance.  On the twenty-sixth of July 1945, Churchill’s Conservative Party 
was defeated, and Clement Attlee took over as Prime Minister.  At that point Stalin was the only 
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original member of the Grand Alliance left.  Lines had already been drawn for reshaping 
international boundaries, and the Big Three had already decided Germany was to be occupied. 
The biggest decision made by the three leaders at Yalta was that Japan surrender 
unconditionally, and this they all agreed to.  Neiberg argued that the atom bomb created 
suspicion between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. but Roosevelt and Stalin knew that fear and mistrust 
had already started forming between the two in March.  It may have been that the atomic bomb 
ensured no hot war took place between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R, throughout the period now 
known as the Cold War because of the mutually assured destruction doctrine. Regardless, the 
Grand Alliance had accomplished its primary objective; the war was over.  The last question to 
address is, was it worth the cost? 
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CHAPTER	4:	CONCLUSION	
 
In 2014, I was on a flight out of Kiev. I am a navigator by profession, and during the 
flight, weather conditions dictated that we cut our flight short and head back to Boryspil (the 
international airport in Kiev).  As we came within fifty miles of the airfield, it became clear that 
the storm had grown and we would need to take immediate action to land somewhere else.  Our 
primary alternative was located in L’viv, a city in western Ukraine.  During our descent, the 
architectural beauty of the city amazed me.  Having spent a great deal of time flying at low 
altitudes over Russia and Ukraine I often noted how dreary the cities looked as a result of Soviet 
city planning.  In particular, the high rises meant to house thousands of proletarians have fallen 
into disarray and take away from the natural beauty of the land.  When we had landed in L’viv 
the people who met us to help with refueling the plane and filing for a return to Kiev were 
friendly and excited to see the unexpected group of Americans.  I mentioned to a friend, “This 
city looks more European than ex-Soviet.”  At that time I was unaware that the city I was 
standing in was part of the debate that had taken place between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill 
during the Second World War. 
At Yalta, L’viv was discussed several times.  It was referred to at the time in its Russian 
form L’vov.  At Yalta Roosevelt recommended placing L’vov on the Polish side of the new 
border being decided.  He stated, “I raised the question of giving them [Poland] Lvov [sic] at 
Tehran.  It has now been suggested that the oil lands in the southwest of Lvov [sic] might be 
given them.”241  There were obvious economic reasons that drove the allies to push for the 
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positioning of L’viv to the east or the west.  In fact, L’viv was an incredibly important topic to 
the three leaders.242  In the end, L’viv was given to the Soviet Union.   
L’viv was not particularly more important than any of the other cities discussed during 
the partitioning of lands, but it was a clear example of how important the partitioning was to the 
people who would have their nationality changed in the name of peace despite their cultural 
realities.  Appendixes A-E show why L’viv appears today drastically different from prominent 
cities in the former U.S.S.R.243 In 1900 L’viv was part of the Austria-Hungary Empire.244 The 
creation of Independent Poland placed L’viv in Polish territory from 1918-1940, until the Red 
Army occupied much of Poland.245  The ethnicity of those in the repartitioned areas was not 
changed when the lines were redrawn.246  In many cases, when groups of people with long 
histories of conflict were placed within the same boundary, this caused serious problems that led 
to numerous wars, battles, and even genocides.  Did Roosevelt and Churchill make too many 
concessions for the sake of peace or were they appeasing Stalin the same way Chamberlain had 
appeased Hitler in 1938 only to create a Cold War that would last seven times longer than World 
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War II?  Deciding who was responsible for poor decisions made before and during World War II 
is difficult. 
There were several missed attempts to prevent war in 1938.  As World War II approached 
Roosevelt had offered to help mediate between Hitler and Chamberlain but was denied the 
opportunity.  Churchill warned against working with Hitler but was unable to persuade his 
predecessor.  Finally, Stalin had attempted to form an alliance with France and Britain, but due 
to arrogance and hostility toward the ideology of the young Soviet Union, he too was denied the 
opportunity to confront Hitler before the Second World War.  Thus the war began.  
The fog of war descended upon Europe, and the British Empire as well as the Soviet 
Union found themselves in desperate positions.  Churchill was elected Prime Minister of a nation 
under siege, and he feared without immediate help the Nazis would bring the British way of life 
to an end.  Stalin, on the other hand, was far too crafty to sit by idly while Hitler overran Europe.  
By negotiating a pact with Hitler he was able to create a physical buffer between Moscow and 
the Germans that likely saved Moscow by a mere fifty miles after they were attacked.  Had he 
not aligned with Hitler in 1939 the Soviet Union would most likely not have been able to 
withstand the assault that occurred in 1941.  However, this victory was short lived, and in 1941 
all of Europe, from west to east, was engaged in the war.  Many variables have been mentioned 
throughout this paper that historians have argued might have changed the course of the war.  If 
Chamberlain had denied Hitler the Sudetenland, the war may not have occurred: or if Hitler had 
not attacked the USSR and focused his efforts on Great Britain, he may have forced Churchill to 
surrender.  By the time the Japanese attacked the United States, however, the leaders of the three 
most powerful non-Axis powers in the world had a common enemy and therefore a reason to join 
forces. 
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The problems facing the Big Three were colossal.  The people of the United States had 
been drawn into the war when they were attacked, but an ocean on each side of the country was a 
physical representation of how far removed the U.S. was from the Soviet Union ideologically 
and from Great Britain tactically speaking.  Despite these problems Roosevelt, Churchill, and 
Stalin came together out of necessity and formed an alliance to stop the German forces.  Stalin 
proved the exigency of the alliance when he told Molotov to yield all prerequisites for the Anglo-
Soviet Alliance in order to gain a promise on the second front he so badly needed.  In the midst 
of Soviet desperation, Churchill and Roosevelt sidelined the second front for as long as they 
could, as long as the Soviet Union was able to remain in the war, in order to pursue their own 
plans and the safety of their own people.  This provided the Anglo-American leaders the 
opportunity to choose their battles based on the probability of success, while the Red Army was 
forced to face the brunt of Hitler’s force on their own wherever the Germans attacked in order to 
survive.  Stalin, known for his vendettas against opponents as well as those that threatened his 
position, did not forget how long his allies delayed their promises.  From that point on he held 
Churchill and Roosevelt accountable for every word they spoke. 
Roosevelt and Churchill made the right decision waiting for the appropriate time to open 
the second front.  They were responsible first to their respective nations and their troops and then 
to the Grand Alliance.  A failed landing in France would have been a serious loss of life and a 
morale setback for the allies and conversely a huge victory for the Axis.  War called for hard 
decisions and there were certainly few opportunities where any of the leaders made a decision 
and were able to feel there were no negative consequences to their decisions.  In the second front 
scenario Churchill and Roosevelt had to live with an irritated and increasingly suspicious Stalin.  
In the winter of 1942 and spring of 1943 the Allies began to see their first real victories and must 
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have considered the alliance a great success.  However, at the same time they were all compliant 
in covering up a massacre.   
In the spring of 1943, the Big Three added postwar planning to the difficult task of war 
fighting.  As the Soviet Union began repelling the German forces Roosevelt and Churchill were 
forced with a difficult ethical and political dilemma.  Victory at Stalingrad had been turning 
point for the Red Army.  After this victory, Stalin was able to recognize his forces would recover 
and he was not as reliant upon the West as he had been while survival was far from assured.  
However, the decision to cover up the massacre at Katyn represented the dramatic shift that had 
taken place as a result of victory at Stalingrad.  Revelation of the Katyn Massacre would have 
created a public outcry that could have forced Roosevelt and Churchill to put their relationship 
with Stalin in jeopardy.  The decision was made by Roosevelt and Churchill to cast their lot with 
Stalin.  They decided victory over Hitler and a chance to work amicably with the Soviet Union 
after the war were more important than providing justice for those killed in Katyn as well as their 
families.  The West’s complicity in covering up Katyn did give Stalin the ability to push his 
allies further than he had been able to prior to Katyn.  He was far more confident and therefore 
willing to put pressure on his partners than he had been in 1942 when they were negotiating.   
In doing so, Roosevelt and Churchill must have weighed their responsibilities to the 
soldiers, whose lives were in their care, to the men and women of their respective nations who 
they represented, and to the Polish people and émigrés who had lost loved ones and fellow 
countrymen in the massacre against victory and Stalin’s necessary support for future peace.  
However, it is possible that these issues did not cross their minds.  Churchill had lost thousands 
of soldiers at Dunkirk and Roosevelt had been willing to lose hundreds of thousands in order to 
  116 
open a second front in 1942.  The thousands of lives that had already been lost in the Katyn 
Forest may not have weighed heavily on the minds of Roosevelt and Churchill at all. 
By the time the Big Three met at Tehran, Roosevelt, concerned with forming an 
international organization dedicated to ensuring peace, began to sideline Churchill and work 
more directly with Stalin.  Roosevelt recognized that the Soviet Union would have a significant 
sphere of influence after the war and he wanted to gain Stalin’s trust for the postwar world.  At 
the same time Roosevelt wanted to block British Imperialism, which he believed had done little 
to prevent war in the past.  This decision was Roosevelt’s greatest tactical mistake.  Roosevelt 
believed he could outwit Stalin by appeasing him during the war and assuming his goodwill 
would be repaid after the war.  When the war was over and the final battle scene played out the 
iron curtain had already begun to descend.   
Could there have been a different outcome after the war?  When Roosevelt and Churchill 
used a second front and Poland as figurative carrots to keep Stalin in the war, they were unaware 
of the ramifications their promises would have.  Their actions were not empty gestures, since 
they did plan on a second front and to give the Soviet Union some of the spoils of war, but they 
were simultaneously taking advantage of the desperate position the Soviet Union was facing.  
This had serious ramifications.  They certainly were unaware that Stalin would hold them 
accountable and take advantage of his superior position at the end of the war when the Red Army 
had control of all the territory from the Soviet Union to Berlin.   
The greatest error the West made dealing with the East was concealing the Katyn 
Massacre.  By allowing the Soviet Union to get away with such an atrocious act against 
humanity, the West lost the moral high ground on any future acts of barbarism, and they gave 
Stalin the confidence he needed to continue his quest for Polish territory after the war.  However, 
  117 
had the allies taken the moral high ground and pressed Stalin to allow an investigation into the 
massacre, he certainly would have been even more difficult to work with during the war.  In the 
end, however, it would not have mattered if relations were tense during the war since relations 
deteriorated after the war anyway and the Soviet Union played a very small role in pacifying 
Japan after victory in Europe had been achieved.   
The end result, however, was victory.  Was that enough to justify all the mistakes?  There 
are no simple decisions in war.  People will lose their lives and those in the unfortunate position 
of making tactical and operational decisions have to base their decisions on what they think will 
achieve the maximum objective with minimum cost with the knowledge they have at the time.  
Roosevelt and Churchill saw no way to win the war without Stalin, and they were certainly 
correct in their belief.  Prior to his death in 1953, Stalin claimed political authority over much 
more than the parts of Poland he gained through negotiations with the President and the Prime 
Minister.  In that sense the two were justified in giving him part of Poland because they did 
attain victory and Stalin still achieved his objective of increasing his territorial domain.  Perhaps 
on a more theoretical level their relationship with Stalin led to a Cold War rather than a hot war, 
and in that way a form of peace, as hostile and apprehensive as it may have been, was obtained 
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Timeline of Events 
 
September 29/30, 1938 – Munich Agreement 
August 23, 1939 – Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed (Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact) 
September 1, 1939 – Germany invaded Poland 
November 13, 1939 – Winter War began (Soviet Finnish War) 
September 17, 1939 – Soviet Union occupied eastern Poland 
April and May 1940 – Katyn Massacre occurred 
May 10, 1940 – Winston S. Churchill took office as Prime Minister 
March 11, 1941 – Lend-Lease Bill signed by Roosevelt 
June 22, 1941 – Operation Barbarossa began 
August 14, 1941 – Atlantic Charter signed 
December 7, 1941 – Pearl Harbor attacked by the Japanese 
May 26, 1942 – Anglo-Soviet Treaty signed 
August 12-17, 1942 – Moscow Conference (Churchill and Stalin) 
August 23, 1942 – Battle of Stalingrad began 
November 8, 1942 – Operation Torch began 
January 14-24, 1943 – Casablanca Conference 
February 2, 1943 – Battle of Stalingrad won by Soviet Union 
April 17, 1943 – Polish Government requested investigation into Katyn Massacre 
July 9, 1943 – Operation Husky commenced 
August 14-24, 1943 – First Quebec Conference 
November 22-26, 1943 – First Cairo Conference 
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November 28- December 1, 1943 – Tehran Conference 
December 4-6, 1943 Second Cairo Conference 
June 6, 1944 – D-Day 
January 30-February 2, 1944 – Malta Conference 
February 4-11, 1944 – Yalta Conference 
April 13, 1944 – Franklin Roosevelt passed away 
May 8, 1945 – V-E Day 
July 17-August 2, 1945 – Potsdam Conference 
August 9, 1945 – Red Army began occupation of Manchuria 
September 2, 1945 – World War II officially over 
 
